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Abstract 
This report provides empirical evidence on the relationship between financial development and economic growth in
the European Union and the Euro area. Results indicate that the type of financing fund receiver matters in the 
financial depth-growth link. 
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Although much debated in the recent literature, the link between financial development and 
economic growth is still of upmost importance, as it attempts to answer how and why the 
varying level of development of financial systems affects growth differentials among 
countries. Evidence on the relation are still ambiguous, as early studies support the existence 
of a positive association, while more recent contributions suggest a nonlinear (U-shaped) 
correspondence. 
This report empirically examines the association between financial development and economic 
growth in several regions, emphasizing the European Union (EU) and the Euro area (EMU) 
context. In detail, the following analysis is offered in order to increase the understanding of 
the potential association. First, an investigation of the finance-growth nexus, with emphasis 
on possible non-linear effects. Second, an extension of this analysis incorporating a 
disaggregation of the financial structure by type of financing (bank credit, debt securities, and 
stock market) as well as type of fund receivers (households, non-financial corporations, and 
financial corporations), in order to further extend our understanding of the potential 
associations. Third, an analysis is included of the effects of upswings or downswings of asset 
prices of various intensity and specifically on the relative market-based and bank-based 
financing impact on economic growth during periods of moderate and extreme price volatility 
in housing and stock markets . Finally, a simulation of the impact on economic growth due to 
the reallocation of credit available in the economy among different sources is provided (i.e. 
banks and the stock market). To the best of our knowledge there is a lack of studies 
investigating this relationship at the EU and EMU level, while there is no research studying 
the importance of financial deepening and structure while considering jointly the type of 
instruments of financing and the type of fund receiver. 
Results obtained from the empirical analysis indicate that an economy’s financial structure 
has a central role in the association between financial development and economic growth. 
Specifically, it is shown that credit provided by banks (as a % of GDP) has a non-linear effect 
on growth and, given the actual financing structure, the peak of the positive impact (turning 
point) is close to 50% of the GDP. Therefore most of the European countries would have 
benefited in terms of economic growth rates if bank credit penetration relative to the gross 
domestic product were smaller during the analyzed period.  
The type of financing matters in the financial depth-growth link, as bank credit appears to 
have the most negative impact (conditionally on substantial financing of households) and 
stock market a more positive one. The type of fund receiver is also important, as credit to 
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households and outstanding debt securities to financial corporations appear to exhibit a 
negative and significant impact on economic growth, whereas credit to nonfinancial firms 
tends to have a positive one. An interesting result obtained indicates that the unconditional 
impact of outstanding debt securities is negative, whereas larger share of debt securities can 
even foster economic growth when GDP growth rates are low relative to lending interest rates 
and/or stock market volatility is high. 
With respect to varying impact during swings of asset prices, an increase in bank credit during 
housing market booms affects economic growth negatively and, in general, economic growth 
rates are hindered by larger credit to deposit ratios. Finally, empirical simulations indicate 
that the impact of changes in the financial composition on economic growth rates is 
economically significant, but depends on the general penetration of finance and the initial 
conditions of a particular economy in a specific period. Namely, the impact depends both on 
the size and structure of finance (both in terms of type of financing instrument and fund user) 
in a particular year and the actual distance from the level of credit yielding the largest 
















The relation between financial development and economic growth is much debated. As hypothesized by 
Schumpeter (1934) and supported by King and Levine (1993) with numerous papers thereafter, the 
varying level of development of financial systems affects economic growth differentials among countries. 
The impact channels vary from just additional financial funds, available to finance investment projects due 
to larger volumes of savings, to more efficient reallocation of funds, thus reaching proper entrepreneurs 
and leading to higher productivity (see e.g. Beck et al., 2000).  The initial literature (see an overview in 
Panizza, 2014) suggested a positive association between financial depth (measured e.g. by the amount of 
domestic credit as a percentage of gross domestic product1) and economic growth, while more recent 
empirical work provides evidence of nonlinear (often an inverse U-shaped) relationship as documented 
in Arcand et al. (2015), Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Law and Singh (2014), and Sahay et al. (2015). It 
is not excluded that the relationship is even more complex and the impact varies with a country’s level of 
economic and institutional development or level of integration (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Masten et al., 
2008), quality of the financial system or its structure (Beck et al., 2014; Gambacorta et al., 2014), and 
other factors. 
The recent overall finding of non-linearity of relationship between financial development (mainly 
bank credit) and economic growth points to a seeming presence of ‘too much finance’, potentially 
connected to large financing of households (see e.g. Beck et al., 2012). These findings have been derived 
mainly using the aggregate credit data of financial institutions and relying on large sets of countries. Some 
recent research concentrated also on smaller sets of more homogeneous countries like members of the 
Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or some groups of developing 
countries (see e.g. Cournède et al., 2015, and Samargandi et al., 2015, correspondingly). It is of further 
interest therefore to find out if the results are similar for the European Union (EU) countries and/or the 
Euro area (EMU) member states that are relatively more homogeneous, especially the later ones. 
Furthermore, we aim also at establishing the impact not only of the total financial deepening, but also of 
its structure both in terms of the type of instrument of financing2 and the type of fund receiver3 
(beneficiary of financing), as well as to further evaluate if and how the finance-growth dependence is 
                                                           
1 Abbreviated as GDP hereafter. 
2 Namely, private domestic credit by banks, private outstanding debt securities issued domestically, as well as the 
stock market capitalization of listed domestic companies. Loosely speaking, we could refer to them as bank credit, 
debt securities, and stock financing. 
3 Namely, by separating credit to households and credit to non-financial corporations as well as splitting the 
outstanding debt securities into those issued by financial and non-financial corporations. 
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sensitive to the growth/slump of asset prices (namely, the stock market and housing prices) in the EU 
member states. 
Consequently, the report focuses on three issues. The first relates to the relationship between 
financial depth, the structure of the financial systems and economic growth. Namely, it includes: (i) the 
replication, update and extension of the seminal paper of Arcand et al. (2015) on the finance-growth 
nexus, with emphasis on possible non-linear effects; (ii) the disaggregation of the financial structure by 
types of instrument of financing in order to estimate their relative effects on growth, and (iii) the 
differentiation between the type of fund receiver with the estimation of their effects on growth.  
The second relates to the investigation of the effects of swings in financial asset prices and 
specifically the empirical analysis of financing impact during periods of moderate and extreme volatility 
(i.e. house and stock market growth and slumps, and booms and busts). To do so we reproduce and extend 
the relevant part of the paper offered by Langfield and Pagano (2016).  
The third relates to the estimation of the potential growth effects in the EU countries due to the 
possible realignment of the financial sector composition, as regards the quantity of credit they provide in 
the economy. In other words, we simulate the possible impact on economic growth due to the reallocation 
of credit provided in the economy among different sources (i.e. banks, private debt securities or the stock 
market). 
Although the report concentrates on the EU and EMU cases, we also present the estimation 
results of the same specifications for the OECD, as well as for all countries having the relevant data. This 
aims at evaluating if previous results apply for various countries and at establishing patterns robust across 
different groups of countries, which would allow being more confident in results obtained for the EU and 
EMU (that also have smaller samples). Furthermore, we use for comparison both the World Bank (WB) 
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data since the former has larger country coverage, 
whereas the later provides series adjusted for structural-breaks. Since the usual specifications of growth 
equations imply implicitly that the equations are dynamic, we employ the dynamic panel models. The 
Anderson and Hsiao (AH, 1982), the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), or more specifically the system GMM of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
and fixed Effects (FE) estimators are used for parameter estimation. The AH estimator is preferred in our 
case, but the GMM is useful to test for admissibility of properly lagged series as instruments. Furthermore, 
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under endogeneity, FE and instrumental variables-based estimates are expected to differ substantially. 
Hence, we employ all of them in the sensitivity analysis. 
Our econometric research strategy of measurement of financial deepening impact on growth rates 
is to start from the simplest specification and then to introduce gradually richer ones with more detailed 
structure and/or non-linearity. Namely, we first consider the impact only of bank credit a la Arcand et al. 
(2015). Then, besides bank credit, we introduce other instruments to capture financing through debt 
securities and stock market, since omitted variables might bias the findings otherwise. Afterwards, we 
consider further decomposition including not only the different types of financing instruments, but also 
separating between various fund receivers. Finally, we consider specifications merged both non-linearity 
as well as different types of instruments and fund receivers. The gradual approach thus reveals the whole 
picture and sensitivity to different specifications without also falling into potential problems connected 
with relatively small number of degrees of freedom and possible overfitting, which would be connected 
with the consideration only of the richest specification.  
Benefitting from panel data estimation techniques mainly over the 1989-2013 period stemming 
from different datasets, our empirical results present a robust picture on the link between financial 
development, its structure, and economic growth in the EU and EMU. Specifically, the obtained 
estimations demonstrate that: 
• credit provided by banks (as a % of GDP) has a non-linear effect on growth and, given the actual 
financing structure, the peak of positive impact (turning point) is closer to 50% of GDP 
(substantially lower than that established in Arcand et al., 2015); 
• the turning point depends on financing structure: if all bank credit were directed towards 
financing of non-financial corporations, the peak of positive impact would shift to around 65% in 
the core EMU countries, with  estimates derived from the EU sample being somewhat smaller; 
• the type of financing (private bank credit, outstanding private debt securities, stock market 
capitalization) matters in the financial depth-growth link: conditionally on the historical pattern 
of credit composition, bank credit appears to have  the most negative impact and stock market a 
more positive one;  
• findings do not seem to be specifically related to or generated by the last financial crisis and hold 
when examining various horizons of future economic growth;  
• the type of fund receiver is very important: credit to households appears to exhibit a negative and 
significant impact on economic growth, whereas credit to nonfinancial firms tends to have a 
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positive one; outstanding debt securities to financial corporations also have a significantly 
negative impact on growth, whereas that of non-financial corporations tend to be insignificant, 
consequently, bank credit to non-financial corporations contributed to the economic growth and, 
on average, was more effective in terms of promoting it as compared with debt securities of non-
financial corporations;  
• although the unconditional impact of outstanding debt securities is negative, when GDP growth 
rates are low relative to lending interest rates and stock market volatility is high, larger share of 
debt securities can even foster economic growth; 
• increased bank credit during housing market booms affects economic growth negatively and, in 
general, economic growth rates are hindered by larger credit to deposit ratios; 
• the impact of changes in the financial composition on economic growth rates depends on the 
initial size (penetration) and structure of finance of a particular economy. 
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the financial 
development-growth relation. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents 





2. Literature review  
This section discusses some empirical literature investigating the link between finance and economic 
growth. To this end, findings presented below concentrate on the issue of financial depth and its relation 
with  non-linearities, the quantity of credit available in the economy and the different sources that provide 
it (bank vs. non-bank credit or firm- and household-oriented credit). 
 
The presence of nonlinearities in the finance – growth relationship 
Recent research on the linkages between economic growth and financial development, measured 
in terms of private credit, revealed the presence of possible nonlinearities of the relationship4; this 
questions the previously established consensus of positive impact of financial development on economic 
growth (see e.g. an overview in Panizza, 2014). For instance, Arcand et al. (2015), Cecchetti and Kharroubi 
(2012) and Law and Singh (2014) using cross-sectional and longitudinal data of a mixture of developed 
and developing countries demonstrated the potential presence of inverse-U-shaped relationship and/or 
existence of thresholds after which growth is negatively affected by further financial development. 
Studying the experience of middle income countries Samargandi et al. (2015) and Coricelli et al. (2012) as 
well find the presence of such a relationship relying on longer time series panels and firm-level data. 
However, Gambacorta et al. (2014) do not find a statistically significant impact for high-income countries. 
Similarly, for the sample of OECD countries considered in Cournède et al. (2015), the estimated turning 
point of financial penetration impact on economic growth is about twice smaller than that estimated in 
Arcand et al. (2015), which was obtained from a global set of countries.  
 
Considering the level of economic growth in non-homogeneous samples 
The aforementioned non-linearity could be a feature more relevant for developing countries or 
could also be an outcome of mixing different types of countries, according to Masten et al. (2008). This 
suggests that the development level could be an important additional factor to be taken into 
                                                           
4 Although other kinds of non-linearity were also considered in the literature (see e.g. Ketteni et al., 2007, who point 
out that non-linearity in initial conditions is present and, after taking it into account, the impact of finance on growth 




consideration and should be either properly modelled or, more generally, countries should be pre-
classified before the analysis. 
Since this report concentrates on the EU and EMU, the level of development of its member states 
(MS) is of great importance for two reasons. First, the impact of financial development on growth in the 
EU countries can be different from that observed in other countries. Second, the EU itself consists of quite 
inhomogeneous countries and, correspondingly, it is not certain that a single unambiguous conclusion 
could be drawn for the whole EU or even the EMU. Hence, we use the more homogeneous group of EMU 
countries named EMU1999 i.e. countries that became members of the Euro zone since 1999 (their list is 
presented in Table 2A in Appendix A). Nevertheless, the empirical estimations should be read with caution 
as they might not fully relate to all member-states. 
 
Intensity of structural change and time varying parameters  
There might be certain underlying causes behind such a different impact in e.g. low- and high-
income countries. For instance, in developing countries the (unconstrained) structural change is likely to 
happen more swiftly. Therefore, the potential structural change coupled with adequate financial 
development leads to greater benefits in terms of economic growth, whereas the structural change in 
developed countries is smoother and such constraints are often less important.  
In the same way, too much finance in developing countries - as compared to that required for the 
potential needs of structural change - does not increase growth rates any further. For example Ductor and 
Grechyna (2015) find that impact becomes negative when rapid growth in financial development is not 
accompanied by sufficient growth in real output. This complements the idea considered in Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2013) regarding the optimal structure of finance given the different development level of a country.  
The above results point to the potentially time-varying ‘optimal level’ of financial development 
that depends on the intensity of (potential) structural change in a country. Accounting for potential time-
varying parameters is also relevant in general, given that the previously estimated positive impact of 
financial development on economic growth vanishes after the 1990s period (see Rousseau and Wachtel, 
2011). Furthermore, a question remains if the recent sever financial crisis had an influence on parameters 




Sources and channels of financial development 
Financial development can take various forms, therefore its impact might also depend on the 
particular sources of financing used in an economy. Relevant empirical evidence argue that the stock-
market-based financial development contributes more to economic growth than the bank-based financial 
development (see Valickova et al., 2015). In addition, the contribution of bank-based credit to growth 
diminishes, while stock-based contribution to growth increases with the level of development (see 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). 
However, these findings often represent average implications and might depend on specific 
circumstances and certain constraints. For instance, if economic growth is constrained by the absence of 
sufficient human capital, it is quite likely that the bank-based loan system can relax this constraint by 
providing resources needed for education, whereas it is less clear how improvements of stock- or bond- 
market-financing conditions would contribute to it, at least directly.  
On the other hand, capital constraint can be relaxed using any of these sources of financing that 
enhance investment. Thus not only the financing sources (e.g. stocks, bonds, loans), but also the channels 
through which the financial penetration is taking place can be of great importance.  
 
Fund receivers’ vs type of financing 
Beck et al. (2012) and Cournède et al. (2015) stress that private credit towards firms and 
households can have different impact on economic growth. Arcand et al. (2015) reconfirm in their 
sensitivity analysis that firm credit does not have a significant non-linear indication, as measured by the 
quadratic term of financial development indicator (also cautioning to potential problems of small sample).  
These findings correlate well with those established for stocks-based financing. Although stocks, 
bonds, and loans differ not only by the type of fund receiver but also in many other ways (among others, 
in terms of control power and guaranties available to funds providers, duration, riskiness, etc.), the fact 
that stocks and enterprise credit are served to firms and not households could point to important 
behavioral differences of household and firm fund receivers, potentially, with less importance of which 




Direct and indirect effects are present 
In many cases, financing facilitates economic growth indirectly by performing specific functions, 
for example through additional investments, relaxation of working capital constraints that bind the 
expansion of firms, the facilitation of international trade and the enhancement of investments in 
education (Beck, 2012). As a result, the impact of financial development on economic growth is often 
estimated to be lower when the investment variable is included (see Valickova et al., 2015). Overall, we 
can infer that in order to understand the relevant mechanisms of the financial development-growth 
impact and to separate their direct and indirect effects, not only the linear analysis of these factors is 
needed but also the study of their interactions.  
 
Crises and regime change 
Financial development and particular the structure of financing can impact not only economic 
growth, but also the resilience of the financial system per se to sever shocks. Breitenlechner et al. (2015) 
report that larger financial sectors lead to significantly worse economic outcomes in the case of a banking 
crisis, even if a positive effect on growth was observed during non-turbulence periods. Furthermore, the 
impact of sever crises on gross domestic product is three times as sever for bank-oriented economies in 
comparison with the market-oriented ones (see Gambacorta et al., 2014). On the other hand, it might be 
also related not only to the structural, but individual healthiness of financial institutions. For instance, 
Balta and Nikolov (2013) state that the more developed financial markets could have even helped to 
cushion the impact of the crisis, but this is conditional on a sound balance sheet structure of banks. 
Therefore, it is worth investigating further the resilience of economic system with different financial 
structures in extreme regimes, allowing for regime-dependent impact parameter changes and taking into 
account specific soundness of the system.  
These aspects are especially important to understand given that: (i) the changes of financing 
patterns after the last crisis seem to be long-lasting (or even permanent) and, (ii) firms that exchanged 
bank loans towards bonds and equities have benefited from faster growth after the crisis (see e.g. Balta 




3. Empirical Strategy and Data
Let i ∈ {1,2,…,N} and t ∈ {1,2,…,T} stand for country and period indices, correspondingly. For a 
fixed value of future horizon h, the following econometric model with country and period fixed effects 
(λi,h and µt,h, respectively) is under consideration: 
,
() =	λ, +	µ, 	+ 	α, +	θ
, + ε,
() 	,  (1) 
where ,
()
stands for the average GDP per capita growth rate over the h ≥ 1 periods ahead5, , denotes
the natural logarithm of income per capita,  , includes explanatory variables to be discussed shortly,
αand θ are the corresponding real-valued parameter and a vector of parameters, whereas ε,
()
 stands
for the usual zero mean error term. It should be pointed out that the model is dynamic because future 
values ,,  > 0, enter ,
()
. Furthermore, since ,
()
contains only future values, both, , and ,
are predetermined thus avoiding at least contemporaneous endogeneity in eq. (1). 
In the sequel, we present the results of estimation of model (1) using several parameter 
estimators. Namely, we employ the AH, GMM, and FE estimators. The box below contains some details 
of the choice of the preferred estimator in our situation. 
Estimation of parameters 
When the number of periods T grows to infinity, θ in eq. (1) can be consistently estimated by
e.g. the FE estimator.  However, when T is fixed, due to incidental parameters problem consistent 
estimation of θ cannot be directly obtained from eq. (1) and the first difference based instrumental
variable estimators of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), or generalized method of moments based Arelano and 
Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995) and  Blundell and Bond (1998) are usually applied because of 
their consistency. 
In larger samples, the GMM estimator is known to be more efficient when T is fixed, but the AH 
estimator is consistent under both N and T asymptotics (Phillips and Han, 2014). The last property is very 
important in our case, because we attempt to estimate the impact of financial deepening on economic 








, where for all i and t the first difference ∆yi,t = yi,t - yi,t-1. It should be pointed
out that very similar results appear when geometric mean of gross growth rates is used instead (the gross rates are 
here needed as straightforward growth rates may also be negative). 
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rather than on N → ∞ asymptotics. Because of this and in order to increase the number of observations, 
we also avoid aggregation of initial data into e.g. 5 or 10 years periods, which would not only substantially 
reduce the number of effective periods (to about 2-4), but also might impose pre-aggregation bias, while 
the removal of business cycle effects is also questionable, since the length of business cycles might vary 
both in time and among different countries.   
Consequently, the AH instrumental variable estimator will be used hereafter as the main one 
(using , to instrument ,). For additional robustness checks, we also report the results obtained 
employing the system GMM and FE estimators. In all the cases the inference is based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering. 
 
The vector of explanatory variables , contains various linear and nonlinear terms (logarithms, 
their squares, interactions, etc.) of economic series. The two main groups will be that of control variables 
and the financial series.  
The included control variables are standard in the literature and, besides the (logarithm of) initial 
level of income , (which in tables below will be abbreviated by LGDP), comprise also logarithm of 
enrolment in secondary education (LEDU), logarithm of government consumption (LGC), logarithm of 
trade openness (LOPEN) and the inverse hyperbolic sign transform6 (IHST) of inflation (LINF). The precise 
definition of variables is given in Appendix B and the sources of original data are explicated in Table 1A of 
Appendix A. The data period varies depending on particular specifications due to availability of more 
detailed data on the financing structure. Apart from the replication of Arcand et al. (2015), the typical 
data sample is 1990 to 2013 and is constrained by the availability of data related to a finer structure of 
finance. 
Regarding the explanatory financial variables (all measured as a % of GDP) we use various 
transformations of the private credit (PC) by deposit money banks, outstanding domestic private debt 
securities (PDS) and stock market capitalization (SMC). In addition, in several cases we also use various 
sub-components of these aggregate variables. See Appendix B for the exact definition and 
transformations to be used in different tables that will follow hereafter. 
                                                           




In order to perform the above empirical estimations several datasets provided by the World Bank 
and the Bank for International Settlements are utilized (see Table 1A in Appendix A), while the results 
presented also refer to different groups of countries (all available countries, OECD, EU and EMU1999) 7 
and time periods that vary depending on specific variables under investigation (e.g. data on debt securities 
and stock market initiates only since 1989-1990, while the data from the Global Financial Development 
Database restricts sample of original series to 2013). We use both the WB and BIS data since the former 
has larger country coverage, whereas the later provides structural-breaks-adjusted series.  
Our econometric research strategy of measurement of financial deepening impact on growth rates 
is to start from the simplest specification and then to introduce gradually richer ones with more detailed 
structure and/or non-linearity. Namely, we first consider the impact only of bank credit a la Arcand et al. 
(2015). Then, besides bank credit, we introduce other instruments to capture financing through debt 
securities and stock market. Afterwards we consider further decomposition including not only the 
different types of financing instruments, but also separating between various receivers of finance 
(households, non-financial firms, and financial firms). Finally, we consider a merged specification covering 
both non-linearity as well as different types of instruments and fund receivers. 
Please note that data series discussed above come with a number of limitations regarding their 
availability in terms of time, continuity and respective structural breaks. The limitations and the respective 
implications for modelling are presented analytically in the box below.  
Some reservations and sensitivity analysis 
Although we attempted to take some complications listed below into account by various means, the 
presented results should be considered with some caution due to several reasons. 
First, the sample size is relatively limited (data on debt securities and stock market capitalization are 
available only since 1989-1990). Consequently, we use yearly data without pre-averaging that would 
further shrink the number of observations. This is necessary because we aim at measuring impacts in the 
EMU and thus the number of countries is very limited and we cannot count on methods relying on 
asymptotics where the number of countries increase to infinity. Nevertheless, for the sensitivity analysis, 
we also present results relying on the system GMM and the FE estimators. In addition, to increase the 
number of observations we consider also larger groups of countries and, given consistent results among 
them, we are more confident in the findings established for the EMU. Note that larger groups cover also 
potentially less homogenous countries where impact of financial deepening and/or its structure might 
differ. Also, we have included in our estimations several additional indicators like credit to deposits ratio, 
                                                           
7 Please refer to Table 2A in the Appendix for the description of the different groups of countries.  
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interaction of bank credit with income per capita and the share of different industries (as % of GDP), but 
they turned out to be less robust in the final specifications than other reported series. 
Second, a preliminary analysis of the data on bank credit available from the Global Financial 
Development Database of the World Bank (WB) revealed not only some gaps in the observations, but also 
a number of structural breaks. Given this, we perform an additional sensitivity analysis by using also the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database, where the credit data is also adjusted for breaks. It 
should be pointed out that we use both sources, because the country coverage in the WB databases is 
larger. Thus, the choice is between a larger country coverage with WB data or likely less noisy series with 
BIS data. 
Third, estimations that rely on this particular period (1989-2013) are informative about processes that 
took place during these years but might be less relevant for other ones (either past or future), particularly 
if relative situations substantially changed e.g. there were important changes in financial structure or their 
inter-dependence. In order to account for this, we aim at including all components of interest, which 
however limits the degree of freedom, especially when additional control variables are further included. 
Consequently, there is a tradeoff between weak inferences versus potential biases due to omitted 
variables. Therefore we present several specifications by starting from the coarse one which is extended 
to more detailed structure and/or richer non-linearity. 
Fourth, and related to the third, even though the period we use is not very long, it is not free of crises, 
and in particular the latest financial crisis which was relatively sever. Omitting the data of 2008-2013 
would further shrink the number of observations. Instead of this we investigate the stability of parameter 
estimates by including financing sources interaction terms with the crisis period dummies. Because in the 
main estimations we use the five year ahead periods of growth rates as defined in eq. (1), we include 
interaction terms starting from 2003, then 2004, 2005, etc. For instance, year 2003 five year average 
growth rate includes only the 2008 crisis period. Thus, the crisis impact might be varying. It should also be 
pointed out that there is no need to include additional dummies without interaction, since our 
specifications already include fixed period effects. 
Fifth, although for the identification of nonlinearities we use nonparametric estimators at the 
exploratory stage of analysis, due to insufficiently large number of observations and the known 
dimensionality problem, we prefer to parameterize the identified non-linearity instead of estimating it 
non-parametrically. It might however induce certain estimation bias if parameterization does not 
completely capture the non-linearity. To that end, we present several alternative parametric 
specifications. Furthermore, we should note that for the EU and EMU, the statistical inference that relies 
on clustering by countries often was based on singular estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions 
because of insufficient degree of freedom. To mitigate this issue we considered estimation of models 





4. Empirical Results 
This section first presents the empirical results on the financial depth – growth nexus by gradual 
introduction of more and more detailed structure of finance coupling it also with the non-linear impact of 
finance on economic growth. Afterwards, the sensitivity is explored of bank-based and market-based 
financing impact on growth to the conditions in housing and stock markets. Finally, the simulations of 
growth differences are presented due to a hypothetical change of composition of financing.  
  
4.1. The financial depth – growth nexus 
 4.1.1. Replicating and extending the literature  
As a first step in the investigation of the relationship between financial depth and growth we reproduce 
the Arcand et al. (2015) study with a focus on different groups of countries (see countries covered by 
various groups in Table 2A of Appendix A), including the OECD, EU, and EMU1999 (see Table 1, below). 
Using the same specification, codes and data8 we reproduce the empirics for the full sample of countries, 
where credit to the private sector as a % of GDP (PC) is found to have a positive and significant relation 
with growth, while its quadratic (non-linear) term (PC2) exhibits a negative one (see column 1). This result 
is in line with the findings of Arcand et al. (2015) and previous related research (Beck and Levine, 2004). 
However, when we limit our sample to OECD, the ESM9, EU or EMU1999 MS the effect is no longer present 
in all our estimations for both variables (see columns 2 to 6, respectively)10 and even the switches of signs 
appear. From this set of empirical estimations we can infer that financial deepening-growth relation is 
possibly region- and/or country-specific, which in our case refers to more developed economies. It should 
be pointed out that such a change of the shape cannot be completely explained by the supposition that 
all more developed economies have larger financial penetration and therefore are on the downwards-
sloping part of the inversed-U curve11. First, in the beginning of the period the credit to GDP ratios in a 
number of them were barely around a quarter or even one fifth of the GDP. Second, not all of investigated 
                                                           
8 Following Arcand et al. (2015) the five year averages are used. The original data and codes are available from the 
journal’s site. See http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10887-015-9115-2 
9 The European Single Market, covering the EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
10 Please note that GMM two step results are not available for EMU1999 MS due to the limited number of 
observations (column 5) thus one step estimations are provided (column 6).  
11 It is also of interest to point out that estimation with the OECD countries excluded from the sample yields positive 




countries had large ratios of private credit to GDP even in the end of the previous century. This finding 
also provides grounds to further explore the financial depth – growth nexus. 
 In order to better understand the relation in question and the obtained estimation we do not 
restrict ourselves only to the quadratic shape and proceed further by plotting the nonlinear effect12 of 
credit to the private sector on economic growth  for all countries, EU and EMU MS in two different time 
periods (1960-2010 & 1990-2010)  (see Figure 1, below). Results obtained provide a quite differentiated 
picture. For the full sample estimations the concentration of the effects provide grounds for the 
justification of nonlinearities found in Arcand et al. (2015) (see Fig. 1A & 1B, for 1960-2010 & 1990-2010, 
respectively). Whereas the picture for both EU and EMU is mixed, with none or less obvious nonlinearities 
present (see Fig. 1C & 1D and Fig. 1E & 1F). So, following Arcand et al. (2015) and the available empirics, 
the pattern of financial depth impact on economic growth in Europe appears to be quite different from 
that established previously for all the countries, while a less apparent non-monotonic relationship is 
supported as well. 
It should be also pointed out that the previous results might be unstable also because a single 
financial development indicator of private credit is used ignoring the contribution and potential relevance 
of other kinds of financing. Consequently, due to omitted variables, the results might hinge on the 
correlation structure between private credit and, say, debt securities and/or stock market indicators as 
well as their relative historical development. This is the issue that we investigate next.  
  
                                                           
12 It is obtained from the respective semiparametric models where the shape of private credit link to growth is 
estimated non-parametrically and the other standard control variables enter log-linearly. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
GMM  
(one step) 
VARIABLES \ Countr.: All avlb. OECD ESM EU EMU1999 EMU1999 
              
LGDP -0.728** -2.612 -2.129*** -8.598 0.189 -0.900*** 
 (0.310) (2.918) (0.455) (12.74) (1.359) (0.348) 
LEDU 2.270*** 1.470 -4.180 7.168* 0 -0.223 
 (0.615) (5.124) (5.851) (3.773) (0) (0.789) 
LGC -1.461** -6.029** -2.702 -2.673 0 -2.571*** 
 (0.742) (3.039) (3.424) (3.531) (0) (0.879) 
LOPEN 1.087** -1.265 -0.655 -3.857 0 0.670** 
 (0.511) (3.954) (2.511) (5.283) (0) (0.293) 
LINF -0.273 -0.0311 -1.177*** -1.414*** 5.756 -0.702** 
 (0.210) (0.367) (0.414) (0.420) (6.489) (0.285) 
PC 3.628** -1.360 -3.651 -0.618 0 -1.350 
 (1.726) (5.474) (5.892) (13.91) (0) (2.208) 
PC2 -2.021*** -1.541 1.340 -1.173 -8.180 0.243 
 (0.729) (2.705) (2.200) (8.355) (7.191) (1.208) 
Observations 917 278 225 195 108 108 
Number of id 133 33 30 27 11 11 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Table 1: Arcand et al. (2015) results: regional sensitivity. Dependent variable: GDP per capita 
growth rates (5 year average). Data and code source: Arcand et al. (2015). Estimator: Generalized 
Method of Moments. Period coverage: 1960-2010 (5 year averages).Figure 1: Nonparametric 
part of credit impact on growth in a semiparametric regressions with all countries, the EU, and 
the EMU1999 countries (by columns) in 1960-2010 and 1990-2010 periods (by rows).  Arcand et 













Figure 1:  Nonparametric part of credit impact on growth in a semiparametric regressions with all countries, the EU, and the 
EMU1999 countries (by columns) in 1960-2010 and 1990-2010 periods (by rows).  Arcand et al. (2015) panel data and specification.  
                     Fig. 1A: All available (1960-2010) Fig. 1C: EU (1960-2010)    Fig. 1E: EMU1999 (1960-2010) 
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 4.1.2. Financial structure and growth  
As a next step to our empirical strategy we proceed with the disaggregation of the financial structure into 
credit offered by banks (LPC), outstanding private issued debt securities (LPDS), together with the stock 
market capitalization (LSMC) (see Table 2). As pointed out in the Empirical Strategy and Data section, we 
use yearly data hereafter. Note that all aforementioned variables are denominated as percentage of GDP 
and in log terms (that were more significant) and that in this group of empirics three different estimators 
are used for validity issues, namely the AH, FE and GMM.  
The results using the WB data in Table 2 reveal that, while both credit by banks and debt securities 
have mostly a negative and statistically significant effect on growth, stock market capitalization presents 
a consistently positive and, as regards EMU MS, even significant influence (see columns 4 and 12 in Table 
2). The tendency is rather stable across different estimators and similar whenever either the WB or BIS 
data are used (see Figures 2 and 3 that plot the respective coefficient estimates of the three financial 
series under investigation).  In fact, with the BIS data (Figure 3), the relative ranking of the impact starting 
from the most negative for bank credit to less negative for debt securities and more positive for stock 
market capitalization is even more consistent among different groups of countries.  
It should be also pointed out that, although not reported, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions in the GMM case cannot reject the adequacy of instruments at the usual significance levels 
(neither is rejected the absence of serial correlation of second order of errors). Hence, it does not look 
that the derived estimates would be substantially susceptible to the endogeneity problem e.g. caused by 
expectations of finance providers about higher growth rates in the future.  
In order to further check the robustness of the results that Table 2 offers we perform two 
additional sets of estimations, namely: (i) to evaluate if results are driven by the financial crisis, interaction 
terms of respective dummy variable periods are included13 (Table C1 in Appendix C), and (ii) to assess 
whether results are robust to potentially different business cycles, the re-estimation of the previous 
specification is performed using different future horizons of averaging of the dependent variable (Table 
C2 and Figure C1 in Appendix C). Both sets of estimations provide similar results revealing robustness of 
the previous findings, as the relative ranking between private credit by banks, outstanding debt securities, 
and stock market capitalization tends to remain the same.  
                                                           
13 Please notice that the interacted terms are defined in line two of Table C1. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Estimator: AH AH AH AH FE FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM GMM 
VARIABLES \ Countr.: All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
LGDP -14.31*** -12.82*** -15.91*** -11.76*** -7.980*** -6.990*** -10.44*** -8.650*** 0.0958 0.272** -0.231** 0.931*** 
 (3.267) (2.740) (3.203) (1.829) (2.257) (1.635) (2.854) (2.105) (0.141) (0.122) (0.0920) (0.330) 
LEDU 1.537** 0.557 0.318 0.0200 2.234* -0.138 -0.294 -0.100 0.282 2.922*** -0.783 -0.535* 
 (0.645) (0.383) (0.454) (0.685) (1.235) (0.855) (0.830) (0.972) (1.038) (1.048) (0.982) (0.319) 
LGC 1.107 2.613** -0.303 4.019*** 0.733 2.004 0.752 3.265 -0.845 -0.867 1.242 0.514 
 (1.119) (1.331) (1.705) (1.389) (1.968) (1.641) (2.956) (3.619) (1.371) (1.156) (1.461) (0.778) 
LOPEN 0.625 1.146* 1.344* 2.797*** 1.224 2.710** 2.782* 4.044*** 1.661*** 1.213*** 1.619*** 0.642*** 
 (0.687) (0.604) (0.773) (0.404) (1.359) (1.013) (1.459) (1.092) (0.489) (0.401) (0.422) (0.241) 
LINF 1.130 0.202 -3.156** -1.534 -1.822 -7.649** -20.57*** 5.126 -7.620*** -7.863* -21.36*** -29.50*** 
 (1.010) (0.931) (1.385) (3.367) (3.613) (3.604) (5.481) (8.822) (2.910) (4.515) (5.135) (9.617) 
LPC -0.861*** -0.411* -0.601** -0.468 -1.705*** -0.508 -0.918** -0.618 -1.467*** -0.723* -0.754** 0.00283 
 (0.310) (0.237) (0.296) (0.525) (0.479) (0.315) (0.366) (0.654) (0.371) (0.387) (0.319) (0.347) 
LPDS -0.177*** -0.233* -0.226* -0.546*** -0.304 -0.502** -0.404** -0.588*** -0.267 -0.481*** -0.467*** -1.294*** 
 (0.0598) (0.139) (0.129) (0.124) (0.213) (0.194) (0.194) (0.157) (0.171) (0.155) (0.134) (0.192) 
LSMC 0.0249 0.0788 0.0263 0.214** 0.246 0.417** 0.0258 0.160 0.539* 0.110 0.154 0.157** 
 (0.0748) (0.0692) (0.0618) (0.0849) (0.209) (0.152) (0.260) (0.245) (0.316) (0.187) (0.204) (0.0730) 
             
Observations 468 360 232 135 533 404 263 152 533 404 263 152 
R-squared 0.675 0.737 0.787 0.897 0.585 0.756 0.833 0.927     
Number of cntr_id 43 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
 
Table 2: Type of finance impact on growth. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. 




Figure 2: Coefficients of financing components in a log-linear model of 
economic growth as in eq. (1) for different groups of countries (WB data, 
AH estimator) 
Figure 3: Coefficients of financing components in a log-linear model of 
economic growth as in eq. (1) for different groups of countries (BIS data, 
AH estimator). 
  
Note: LPC - private credit by banks to GDP; LPDS - outstanding private 
debt securities to GDP; LSMC - stock market capitalization to GDP. 
Note: LPC - private credit by banks to GDP; LPDS - outstanding private debt 
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 To investigate if some non-linearity remains after taking different types of financing into account, 
we perform the local polynomial smoothing of projection of residuals of previously discussed equation on 
the three types of financing. Figure 4 (see below) offers the plots of the nonlinear individual effects of 
bank credit, outstanding private issued debt securities and the stock market capitalization on residuals of 
growth equations discussed previously for all the countries (Fig. 4A, 4B & 4C, respectively) and the EMU 
MS (Fig. 4D, 4E & 4F, respectively). Plots explicitly reveal for the EMU group of countries that bank credit 
has a smoothed inverted U shape close to the left-hand side of the figure (Fig. 4D), private issued debt 
securities follow a more negative trend (Fig. 4E) while stock market capitalization presents less obvious 
pattern (Fig. 4F). Similar inferences can be made for the figures that provide the same estimates for the 
full sample of countries (Fig.4A, 4B & 4C, respectively).  
 Table 3 provides the findings when we extend our previous analysis by first parameterizing the 
potential non-linearity and, initially, including the quadratic (non-linear) term of credit offered by bank 
(LPC2) (columns 1-4). Results confirm the pattern of Figure 4 i.e. both the linear and the quadratic term 
of bank credit is found to be statically significant, that is positive and negative, respectively. Also, both 
private issued debt securities (LPDS) and the stock market capitalization (LSMC) variables retain their 
signs. Furthermore, we did not detect significant non-linearity for them anymore. The negative impact of 
outstanding private debt securities is slightly puzzling. Hence, we investigate whether their impact 
depends on specific economic conditions. Given that debt securities are often of longer term, we expect 
them to contribute to stability when markets are volatile (as suggested in Contesi and Russ, 2013) and/or 
economic growth is insufficient to pay for current interest rates.  
 Positive impact of debt securities in connection with volatile or difficult periods when income 
growth is insufficient to pay out debts can stem from several sources. First, if long term debt securities 
are used to finance some real projects and not for trading, having a bond issued before a troublesome 
period and of sufficient duration to overcome it, enables a firm to continue the implementation of 
investment projects further. On the contrary, banks often have the right and willingness to inquire for 
more collateral needed to cover their loans whenever e.g. the prices of collateral drop due to uncertainty 
and/or volatility. This might create substantial liquidity problems both for the direct debtors (as well as 
their debtors and so on) and divert time and efforts from the implementation of relevant projects to 
search for additional means to survive. Second, the more debt securities market is developed, the easier 
and better it serves as an alternative mode of finance on its own. This reduces potential pressures and 
probability of bank actions that they might be willing to take during uncertain and/or difficult periods. 
24 
Figure 4: Nonparametric regressions of residuals of log-linear model on type of financing components to GDP (private credit by banks 
to GDP, outstanding private debt securities to GDP, and stock market capitalization to GDP). Results for all countries and the EMU1999 
countries represented in the rows. Variability bounds account only for nonparametric regression. 
Fig. 4A: Private credit by banks, All countries Fig. 4B: Private debt securities, All countries Fig. 4C: Stock market, All countries 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES \ Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
LGDP -14.87*** -13.03*** -17.67*** -11.66*** -14.94*** -12.39*** -16.39*** -11.67*** -16.50*** -12.61*** -15.61*** -13.26*** 
 (2.948) (2.630) (2.614) (1.858) (2.772) (2.348) (2.435) (2.069) (2.744) (2.400) (2.638) (1.973) 
LEDU 1.643*** 0.685* 0.411 0.0751 1.475*** 0.607 0.390 0.636 1.720*** 0.893* 0.566 0.331 
 (0.578) (0.390) (0.452) (0.685) (0.566) (0.398) (0.370) (0.705) (0.580) (0.463) (0.526) (0.679) 
LGC 0.825 2.332* 0.0157 4.776*** 0.494 2.319 0.0544 4.968*** 0.0483 2.083 -0.282 2.143*** 
 (1.011) (1.289) (1.764) (1.291) (1.032) (1.449) (1.719) (1.262) (0.920) (1.290) (0.911) (0.780) 
LOPEN 0.636 1.053* 1.123 2.839*** 0.756 1.179* 1.119 2.980*** 0.859 1.296** 1.528** 3.345*** 
 (0.660) (0.592) (0.734) (0.401) (0.689) (0.670) (0.725) (0.374) (0.668) (0.645) (0.670) (0.461) 
LINF 0.708 0.291 -2.581** -1.186 0.529 -0.626 -3.710*** 0.170 0.233 -0.710 -4.122*** 3.547 
 (0.981) (0.967) (1.205) (3.209) (1.047) (1.406) (1.274) (3.477) (1.070) (1.610) (1.178) (4.129) 
LPC 4.070** 3.125*** 6.506** 4.419 4.441* 4.151* 4.138 3.445 3.758 2.705 2.539 -8.663 
 (1.653) (1.030) (2.961) (4.314) (2.275) (2.196) (2.557) (4.493) (2.497) (2.355) (2.769) (6.028) 
LPC2 -0.607*** -0.427*** -0.878** -0.580 -0.676** -0.554* -0.589* -0.476 -0.579* -0.368 -0.385 0.977 
 (0.213) (0.133) (0.382) (0.536) (0.307) (0.286) (0.327) (0.523) (0.337) (0.298) (0.349) (0.650) 
LPDS -0.180*** -0.235* -0.232** -0.481*** -0.214*** -0.278** -0.293** -0.594*** -0.527*** -0.589** -0.842* -1.402*** 
 (0.0544) (0.129) (0.109) (0.157) (0.0570) (0.134) (0.117) (0.119) (0.188) (0.259) (0.442) (0.305) 
LPDS*SM_VOL80 - - - - 0.0540*** 0.0435** 0.0662*** 0.0430*** 0.0435** 0.0446** 0.0679*** 0.0351** 
     (0.0175) (0.0195) (0.0209) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0155) 
LPDS*exp(RIR-RGDPGR) - - - - - - - - 0.340* 0.356 0.676 0.801** 
         (0.192) (0.231) (0.416) (0.339) 
LSMC 0.0150 0.0854 0.0191 0.220*** -0.0198 0.0476 -0.00734 0.180*** -0.0209 0.0493 -0.0404 0.100* 
 (0.0760) (0.0691) (0.0583) (0.0778) (0.0782) (0.0678) (0.0510) (0.0580) (0.0768) (0.0719) (0.0519) (0.0607) 
             
Observations 468 360 232 135 424 323 212 127 371 270 161 84 
R-squared 0.690 0.745 0.798 0.899 0.684 0.728 0.808 0.908 0.707 0.756 0.860 0.937 
Number of cntr_id 43 30 23 11 39 28 20 10 37 26 19 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Table 3: Sensitivity: non-linear impact (LPC, LPC2). Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates over 5 year periods 
ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample initiating mainly from 1990 (LGDP 
instrumented also with previous data) 
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 Hence, the sensitivity of previous estimations is further examined with the introduction of two 
additional variables: (i) the interaction between outstanding debt securities and the indicator function, 
taking value one when volatility of the stock market exceeds its 8th decile (LPDS*SM_VOL80), and (ii) the 
interaction between outstanding debt securities and the difference between real lending interest rates 
and the real GDP growth rates (LPDS*exp(RIR-RGDPGR)). The latter variable captures the spread between 
available lending rates and growth and thus provides insights on the underlying financial conditions.  
 Empirics robustly reveal that the interaction between debt securities and stock market volatility 
has a positive coefficient (see columns 5-12 of Table 3) thus reducing the unconditional negative effect of 
debt securities. This correlates with the insight e.g. by Contessi and Russ (2013) that market-based funding 
can act as a cushion in times of higher volatility. When the interaction between debt securities, interest 
rates and growth enters the equation, findings exhibit a clearly positive association with growth, and thus 
revealing that in periods with relatively high interest rates or low GDP growth rates, long-term based debt 
security financing helps retain economic activity. It is of interest to note further that the (non-linear) 
private credit impact becomes insignificant, corroborating that the newly introduced variables are 
correlated with the developments in the bank credit market as we hypothesized discussing the economic 
mechanism behind it. On the other hand, the number of explanatory variables becomes fairly large for 
the given number of observations, hence the small number of degrees of freedom might be truly binding 
the inference.  
In the previous specification we used a simple way (with LPC and LPC2) to parametrize the non-
linearity observed in Figure 4. However, in the original Arcand et al. (2015) paper the PC and square of PC 
(PC2) were used. If we augment the model with these terms and retain the significant ones, we get the 
results presented in Table 4. They correspond perfectly with Figure 4, as the LPC and PC terms are able to 
capture the hump-shaped nonlinearity observed around 50% of credit to GDP, whereas the PC and PC2 
capture the U-shaped part observed around 200%. The previous results remain similar qualitatively and 
quantitatively while all the other variables of interest preserve the same signs and significance. It is also 
of interest to note that the estimations provided already in Table 1 column 7 (that are related to the EMU 
MS case) had pointed out that PC and PC2 could have been rather driven/capturing the U-shaped part.  
 Relying on the results presented in Appendix E, Figure 5 plots the marginal effects of bank credit 
by banks on GDP growth rates in connection with column (3) of Table 3 and Table 4 (i.e. specifications 
with LPC and LPC2, and PC, PC2, and LPC, respectively). It shows that the positive effect of bank credit on 
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growth disappear much faster than that established in Arcand et al. (2015) who based on panel data found 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
LGDP -14.85*** -13.45*** -17.50*** -11.89*** -14.78*** -12.43*** -16.12*** -11.80*** -16.62*** -12.70*** -14.97*** -13.02*** 
 (2.823) (2.651) (2.609) (1.869) (2.688) (2.215) (2.261) (1.782) (2.696) (2.257) (2.504) (2.013) 
LEDU 1.677*** 0.706* 0.424 0.127 1.424*** 0.616 0.380 0.633 1.614*** 0.882* 0.520 0.323 
 (0.553) (0.372) (0.452) (0.659) (0.553) (0.403) (0.393) (0.716) (0.569) (0.457) (0.521) (0.676) 
LGC 0.832 2.187* -0.0434 4.606*** 0.353 2.134 -0.459 4.903*** 0.0331 2.093 -0.376 2.151** 
 (0.985) (1.297) (1.752) (1.302) (1.048) (1.523) (1.763) (1.276) (0.930) (1.333) (0.910) (0.840) 
LOPEN 0.634 0.977 1.105 2.698*** 0.825 1.206* 0.929 2.931*** 0.958 1.364** 1.438** 3.482*** 
 (0.651) (0.611) (0.758) (0.313) (0.691) (0.700) (0.753) (0.419) (0.678) (0.660) (0.692) (0.465) 
LINF 0.749 0.486 -2.650** -0.542 0.433 -0.442 -3.360** 0.326 0.0590 -0.732 -3.966*** 3.041 
 (0.990) (0.957) (1.334) (3.664) (1.058) (1.351) (1.389) (4.045) (1.085) (1.518) (1.126) (4.175) 
LPC 1.840** 1.653*** 1.983 2.949** 2.724*** 3.015*** 3.082* 1.114 2.672*** 2.484*** 2.321 -5.668* 
 (0.756) (0.635) (1.537) (1.503) (0.960) (0.947) (1.591) (4.264) (1.020) (0.838) (1.485) (3.259) 
PC -0.0630*** -0.0459** -0.0555 -0.0721** -0.0998*** -0.0869*** -0.0916** -0.0299 -0.101*** -0.0772*** -0.0761** 0.101 
 (0.0208) (0.0181) (0.0435) (0.0333) (0.0306) (0.0280) (0.0427) (0.0763) (0.0328) (0.0248) (0.0378) (0.0618) 
PC2 0.00012*** 8.25e-05** 9.22e-05 0.00014* 0.00024*** 0.00021*** 0.00022** 4.36e-05 0.00027*** 0.00021*** 0.0002** -0.00019 
 (4.09e-05) (3.53e-05) (0.000116) (7.52e-05) (8.26e-05) (7.13e-05) (0.00010) (0.000154) (9.34e-05) (6.60e-05) (0.000102) (0.000133) 
LPDS -0.183*** -0.238** -0.230** -0.415*** -0.214*** -0.283** -0.298*** -0.581*** -0.502** -0.633*** -0.943** -1.457*** 
 (0.0528) (0.120) (0.110) (0.136) (0.0536) (0.121) (0.108) (0.0863) (0.196) (0.243) (0.451) (0.297) 
LDS*SM_VOL80     0.0473*** 0.0349* 0.0520*** 0.0423*** 0.0446*** 0.0451** 0.0665*** 0.0349** 
     (0.0159) (0.0180) (0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0158) 
LPDS*exp(RIR-RGDPGR)         0.311 0.386* 0.754* 0.819** 
         (0.197) (0.227) (0.422) (0.333) 
LSMC -0.0101 0.0640 0.0174 0.201*** -0.0142 0.0526 -0.00858 0.182*** -0.0191 0.0480 -0.0554 0.103* 
 (0.0735) (0.0631) (0.0573) (0.0685) (0.0748) (0.0649) (0.0523) (0.0578) (0.0720) (0.0686) (0.0493) (0.0586) 
             
Observations 468 360 232 135 424 323 212 127 371 270 161 84 
R-squared 0.695 0.749 0.798 0.901 0.691 0.735 0.814 0.908 0.715 0.763 0.863 0.938 
Number of cntr_id 43 30 23 11 39 28 20 10 37 26 19 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Sensitivity: non-linear impact (LPC, PC, PC2). Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data 
source: World Bank. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample initiating mainly from 1990 (LGDP instrumented also with previous data). 
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Figure 5: Marginal impact of private credit by banks (PC) on the GDP per capita growth rate 
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In the case of the EMU1999, the point estimate of marginal impact (the solid lines) becomes zero 
and the peak of credit impact on GDP growth rates is reached at levels when the bank credit makes up 
about half of GDP. For other groups of countries the turning point is even less than that. These findings 
would show that the actual bank credit penetration in many economies could be way more harmful for 
economic growth than estimated previously. However, the established turning point is likely to be 
conditional on who receives the credit i.e. not only the amount, but also the structure of credit is 
important. This is the issue that we consider next. 
 
4.1.3. Disaggregation of credit, fund receiver, and further robustness checks  
Up to this point of our empirical strategy we looked at the financing structure and potential non-linear 
impact. Next we turn to the questions if different fund receivers also matter for economic growth and for 
that purpose we further disaggregate credit to the private sector into more detailed components (see 
Table 5). We differentiate private credit into the one received by households (LPCHSH) and non-financial 
corporations (LPCNFC), as well as the outstanding private debt securities into the ones issued by financial 
(LDSFCO) and non-financial corporations (LDSNFC) (all relative to GDP and in log terms).  
Taking into account period effects, the results provide a rather robust association between the 
variables in question (see columns 1-4). In detail, credit towards households is found to have a detrimental 
association with growth, while the credit for non-financial corporations has a non-significant effect or 
even the positive and significant impact in the case of the EMU1999. On the other hand, securities issued 
by financial corporations have also a negative impact on growth mainly in the EU and EMU MS while no 
significant effect is estimated for the securities issued by non-financial corporations. However, it should 
be pointed out that the globalization of financial institutions that recently became especially intense (see 
REF ???) may be partially responsible for such an effect, because the domestic savings attracted e.g. 
through debt securities can be outsourced to other markets thus reducing local funding of investments.  
The presented results are robust and stronger in terms of statistical significance when no period 
effects are considered (columns 5-8). In general, the separation of bank private credit into that flowing to 
households and non-financial firms has much clearer impact difference as compared with that of the split 
of outstanding debt securities issued by the financial and non-financial corporations (see Figure 6). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









VARIABLES \ Countr.: All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 
                  
LGDP 3.749 -5.097 -11.32** -8.356* 4.504 0.151 -1.089 -5.979 
 (6.203) (5.517) (4.436) (4.502) (9.163) (9.290) (9.098) (6.670) 
LEDU 0.558 0.115 0.118 0.0475 3.670*** 3.475*** 3.755*** 3.366*** 
 (0.645) (0.419) (0.510) (0.572) (0.814) (0.889) (1.068) (1.265) 
LGC 8.057** 2.189 0.747 3.881*** 10.85** 6.878*** 7.505*** 7.287*** 
 (4.065) (1.632) (2.553) (1.495) (4.231) (2.347) (2.659) (1.632) 
LOPEN 0.789 -0.472 0.660 2.609*** -0.837 -1.716 -1.574 -0.897 
 (1.291) (1.008) (1.295) (0.559) (1.391) (1.517) (1.841) (1.541) 
LINF 1.236 -2.983 -0.363 -6.580*** -3.938 -5.567* -7.682** -17.25*** 
 (4.265) (2.025) (2.448) (2.528) (4.210) (2.983) (3.633) (3.533) 
LPCHSH -2.977*** -2.214*** -1.462*** -1.573** -4.237*** -4.084*** -4.108*** -3.785*** 
 (0.938) (0.701) (0.520) (0.779) (1.010) (1.001) (0.970) (0.524) 
LPCNFC -0.454 0.812 0.216 0.659* -0.444 0.395 0.523 0.381 
 (1.008) (0.511) (0.455) (0.395) (0.894) (0.671) (0.684) (0.382) 
LPDSFCO -0.203 -0.314 -0.332* -0.309** -0.517** -0.479** -0.414** -0.394*** 
 (0.207) (0.218) (0.170) (0.121) (0.255) (0.221) (0.206) (0.151) 
LPDSNFC -0.0436 -0.200 -0.228 -0.0504 -0.0442 -0.128 -0.159 -0.332** 
 (0.234) (0.198) (0.198) (0.0915) (0.285) (0.263) (0.280) (0.153) 
LSMC -0.0941 0.147 0.0375 0.0838 -0.0853 -0.0624 -0.0321 0.0616 
 (0.180) (0.149) (0.149) (0.0797) (0.117) (0.112) (0.111) (0.0948) 
         
Observations 259 241 175 132 259 241 175 132 
R-squared 0.553 0.733 0.786 0.886 0.268 0.371 0.443 0.540 
Number of cntr_id 25 22 16 9 25 22 16 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Table 5: Detailed split by types of financing and subjects. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per 
capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: Bank for International 
Settlements. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample initiating mainly from 
1989 (LGDP instrumented also with previous data). 
 
We can further infer from the analysis of structural impact that in more developed countries (and 
especially the EMU1999 MS) bank credit to non-financial corporations contributes and not hinders 
economic growth. Furthermore, it is more effective in terms of promoting growth relative to the financing 
using debt securities of non-financial corporations. Hence, the negative average impact of bank credit 
established previously in Tables 2, C1, and C2 hinges on the large share of credit going to households and 
financial institutions. 
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Figure 6: Coefficients in a log-linear model of economic growth as in eq. (1) of different financing components and subjects in 
different groups of countries (AH estimator) 
  
 
   
Note:    LPCHSH - private credit to household to GDP; LPCNFC - private credit to non-financial corporations to GDP; LPDSFCO - debt 



























All avlb. OECD EU EU1999
LDSFCO LDSNFC
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 In addition to our empirical estimations on the finance-growth nexus we provide further 
robustness checks with emphasis on the overall findings of this section; that is we merge financial 
structure, non-linearity and fund receiver specifications into a single equation. It should be noted that at 
this point our effort is to keep number of parameters as low as possible while accounting for any related 
influences. For that purpose we augment our previous specifications with the ratios of household to firm’s 
private credit and of debt securities issued by financial and non-financial corporations  
In particular, Table 6 (see below) offers the empirics of the non-linear impact of financial depth 
to growth similar to Table 3, with the inclusion of two interaction terms14: (i) the interaction between 
bank issued credit and the ratio of credit to household and non-financial corporations (LPC*PCRAT), and 
(ii) the interaction between outstanding debt securities and the ratio of debt securities issued by financial 
and non-financial corporations (LPC*DSRAT). The results are consistent with previous findings from Table 
5 that credit to households’ affects growth negatively. Furthermore, in the EMU1999 MS both interaction 
terms have a negative and statistically significant effect on growth (see columns 4 and 8 in Table 6), thus 
underlying the importance of financial structure in the financial depth-growth relation. As previously, the 
impact of the allocated debt securities is less clear-cut whenever we look at its impact on growth in 
different country groups.  
Switching to data from the BIS and re-estimating all main previous specifications (see Table 7) 
confirm the importance of financial structure as results present nearly the same signs and significances 
(see e.g. columns 9-12 related to the latest specification discussed in this section).  The important 
difference being that non-linearity of bank credit impact in Table 7 becomes (more) significant than that 
which was observed using the WB data in Table 6 after the introduction of variables representing the 
structure (ratios) of finance receivers. It should be also pointed out that this appearance of significance of 
parameter estimates can be attributed to the usage of the BIS data corrected for breaks, since the country 
coverage in the OECD, EU, and EMU MS cases is the same in both estimations. 
                                                           
14 It should be pointed out that the signs of estimations remain the same if additional unconditional shifts of 
composition are also included i.e. PCRAT and/or DSRAT, but significance of non-linear impact of bank credit become 
less strong due to their high multicollinearity with the introduced series (as well these series are significant only in 
one case each). Nevertheless, the specification without these shifts seems to be more economically intuitive yielding 
the total effect of logarithm of private credit by banks as a function of the ratio of credit to households and firms, 
i.e. the impact is represented by (α0 + α1·PCRAT)·LPC, and would say that the total impact of logarithm of private 
credit (LPC) would decrease with increasing ratio of household to firm credit (PCRAT) whenever α1<0 as is currently 
in Table 7. 
34 
It should be noted further that the interaction term of credit with the household-to-firm in 
specifications presented in the last two tables affects the shape and peak of the impact of credit on GDP 
growth rates. Those presented in Figure 5 can be thought as connected with the averages of actual 
household-to-firm financing ratios. Using the most significant results of Column (12) from Table 7 we 
derive using results presented in Appendix E that, whenever all bank credit is devoted to firms, the peak 
of the positive impact of bank credit on growth is reached whenever it makes up about 65% of GDP. 
 
Summarizing all the empirics of financing and growth nexus provided in Section 4.1, we first can 
confirm that there is a significant non-linearity of bank credit also in the EU and EMU member states, 
although the peak of non-linear impact seems to be reached at significantly smaller levels of credit-to-
GDP in comparison with the previous findings established mostly relying on global country sets and using 
only credit data without taking other types of financing into account. 
Given the historical composition and use of financing, the split of finance by the type of instrument 
(bank credit, debt securities, and stock market financing) reveals robustly that there was too much of bank 
credit and its reduction would have benefited economic growth. The analysis by the fund receiver 
discloses further that the main suspect of problems connected with bank credit is the credit flowing to 
households.  
 These findings are quite robust to various perturbations in the performed sensitivity analyses as 
well as using different datasets, although the results of final specifications, which account for various 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
                  
LGDP -12.28*** -10.67*** -15.55*** -13.36*** -6.033 -14.00* -15.84** -11.93*** 
 (4.170) (3.432) (5.722) (4.320) (4.664) (7.353) (7.097) (4.455) 
LEDU 0.835 0.667* 0.390 0.613 0.637 0.321 0.332 0.581 
 (0.527) (0.404) (0.349) (0.685) (0.571) (0.393) (0.418) (0.780) 
LGC 2.063 2.398 -0.288 3.800*** 4.313 0.172 -0.979 3.937*** 
 (1.557) (1.500) (2.626) (1.370) (2.774) (2.317) (3.154) (1.227) 
LOPEN 1.006 1.103 0.970 2.140*** 0.388 -0.783 0.0676 2.107*** 
 (0.635) (0.747) (0.891) (0.620) (1.074) (0.879) (1.296) (0.650) 
LINF -0.414 -0.330 -4.329*** -1.482 0.678 -2.550 0.261 -4.814* 
 (1.439) (1.483) (1.316) (2.697) (3.169) (1.820) (2.469) (2.902) 
LPC 5.783** 4.195* 4.554* 4.517 0.263 4.943 6.286 5.820 
 (2.816) (2.303) (2.602) (5.131) (4.120) (3.769) (4.712) (5.548) 
LPC2 -0.765** -0.531* -0.602* -0.557 -0.0456 -0.551 -0.720 -0.764 
 (0.373) (0.294) (0.327) (0.563) (0.460) (0.442) (0.576) (0.611) 
LPDS -0.315*** -0.264** -0.289*** -0.595*** -0.209 -0.333* -0.586*** -0.0720 
 (0.0628) (0.128) (0.104) (0.113) (0.163) (0.191) (0.153) (0.180) 
LPDS*SM_VOL80 0.0438** 0.0436** 0.0688*** 0.0346** 0.0173 0.0538** 0.0579** 0.0343 
 (0.0188) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0146) (0.0257) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0222) 
LSMC -0.00385 0.0615 -0.0508 0.135** 0.198 0.262 0.116 0.106* 
 (0.0915) (0.0842) (0.0746) (0.0530) (0.129) (0.170) (0.175) (0.0598) 
LPC*PCRAT -0.163 -0.255* -0.326** -0.393*** -0.348 -0.407** -0.364*** -0.316** 
 (0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.136) (0.222) (0.176) (0.119) (0.133) 
LPDS*DSRAT     -0.000115 -0.000389 0.000501* -0.00271* 
     (0.000731) (0.000694) (0.000262) (0.00143) 
         
Observations 325 296 189 117 229 211 151 111 
R-squared 0.666 0.709 0.800 0.915 0.676 0.777 0.806 0.907 
Number of cntr_id 31 26 17 10 25 22 16 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
Table 6: Sensitivity: Non-linear impact with structure ratios. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per 
capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank and Bank 
for International Settlements. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample 







Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 7: Sensitivity: results with BIS data of credit and debt securities. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates 
over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: Bank for International Settlements. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with 
sample initiating mainly from 1990 (LGDP instrumented also with previous data).
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES \ Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
             
             
LGDP 3.507 -6.063 -12.13** -8.641* 1.361 -15.71 -25.58** -13.98*** -1.743 -19.99** -27.12*** -15.99*** 
 (5.801) (6.506) (4.771) (4.595) (6.346) (12.36) (11.22) (4.803) (6.518) (9.902) (10.32) (5.294) 
LEDU 0.684 0.274 0.149 0.157 0.972 0.383 0.287 0.581 0.947 0.289 0.139 0.496 
 (0.608) (0.496) (0.545) (0.675) (0.661) (0.465) (0.505) (0.773) (0.613) (0.418) (0.468) (0.657) 
LGC 7.318** 2.216 0.352 3.770** 6.609* 0.0982 -3.024 2.342* 5.828 -0.755 -3.469 1.589 
 (3.589) (1.949) (2.737) (1.701) (3.540) (3.287) (4.333) (1.320) (3.660) (2.744) (3.786) (1.535) 
LOPEN 0.758 -0.391 0.280 2.662*** 0.579 -0.827 -0.873 1.943*** 0.256 -1.148 -1.025 1.451* 
 (1.290) (1.058) (1.256) (0.647) (1.197) (0.971) (1.323) (0.692) (1.200) (0.865) (1.172) (0.777) 
LINF 0.305 -3.595* -1.451 -8.387*** 0.311 -3.623* -1.069 -5.242* 0.316 -3.511 -0.574 -3.520 
 (4.013) (1.970) (2.406) (3.250) (4.002) (2.034) (3.646) (2.891) (3.772) (2.372) (4.406) (2.562) 
LPC -3.320*** -1.882*** -1.453*** -1.187* 1.892 10.95 18.95 11.08*** 3.404 14.84 22.20** 12.80*** 
 (1.149) (0.728) (0.544) (0.689) (5.144) (9.640) (11.81) (3.970) (5.539) (9.267) (11.29) (4.652) 
LPC2     -0.608 -1.481 -2.411* -1.416*** -0.715 -1.847* -2.740** -1.526*** 
     (0.615) (1.124) (1.424) (0.449) (0.628) (1.087) (1.369) (0.532) 
LPDS -0.280* -0.272** -0.509*** -0.343** -0.290** -0.244*** -0.346*** -0.303** -0.210 -0.201** -0.309** -0.299 
 (0.151) (0.135) (0.147) (0.143) (0.143) (0.0913) (0.103) (0.131) (0.146) (0.0998) (0.142) (0.184) 
LPDS*SM_VOL80     0.0122 0.0364* 0.0497** 0.0343** 0.0200 0.0385** 0.0492* 0.0346** 
     (0.0218) (0.0196) (0.0238) (0.0164) (0.0204) (0.0190) (0.0257) (0.0160) 
LSMC -0.00304 0.182 0.0712 0.0990 -0.00923 0.178 0.0769 0.0966*** 0.00769 0.207* 0.0726 0.0873** 
 (0.162) (0.157) (0.161) (0.0840) (0.165) (0.133) (0.140) (0.0352) (0.155) (0.125) (0.135) (0.0383) 
LPC*PCRAT         -0.295 -0.345** -0.275** -0.437*** 
         (0.238) (0.156) (0.118) (0.111) 
LPDS*DSRAT         0.000134 0.000260 0.000997 -0.000547 
         (0.000483) (0.000522) (0.000657) (0.00136) 
Observations 267 248 182 139 257 238 174 131 248 230 167 124 
R-squared 0.556 0.733 0.795 0.885 0.599 0.794 0.820 0.907 0.658 0.804 0.819 0.914 
Number of cntr_id 25 22 16 9 25 22 16 9 25 22 16 9 
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4.2. Financial depth, growth and swings of asset prices in housing and 
stock markets 
Financial structure can have different impact on economic growth during different market conditions e.g. 
the upswings or downswings of asset prices of various intensity. In order to consider such effects and 
financing structure (namely, the bank-based vs market-based) impact on economic growth rates, we 
proceed by following a part of the study offered by Langfield and Pagano (2016) with some extensions.  
Specifically, the hypothesis is tested that bank-based financial structures feature lower economic growth, 
particularly during times of smaller or larger swings in asset prices of stock and housing markets. According 
to this hypothesis, banks’ credit creation features inefficiencies that could be detrimental to economic 
growth, both in the upswing and the downswing of asset prices, where also these inefficiencies can be 
magnified during times of crisis.  
 As in the previous section, one of our aims is to evaluate whether findings established previously 
(namely, in Langfield and Pagano, 2016) that were obtained relying on a broader set of countries also hold 
whenever we consider narrower regions. Although our general interest again is mainly in the EU and EMU 
MS, we also provide empirics for the OECD as well as the full sample of countries.  
 To evaluate the impact of structure, we generate an additional bank-market ratio variable defined 
as the ratio between private credit to outstanding debt securities and stock market capitalization (PC_MK) 
and estimate the specification a la Langfield and Pagano by including dummies of growth and slump 
periods of the stock market (Table 8 & 10) and the housing market (Table 10 & 11). In detail, Table 8 
provides the findings of the estimations referring to stock market growth and slump periods (SM growth 
and SM slump, respectively), taking the value 1 when a country’s stock market increase or decrease at an 
average annual rate of at least 10%, 5%, 3%, and 2% over 5 years (see columns 1-4, 5-8, 9-12 and 13-16, 
respectively). The interaction variable between the aforementioned dummies and the bank-market ratio 
is also used. The considered range of various growth rates represents different intensity/pressure of asset 
prices: from bums and boosts to more moderate growth and slump periods. 
Results reveal that for the whole sample of countries bank-market ratio is negatively correlated 
with GDP growth, in line with Langfield and Pagano (2016) (see columns 1, 5, 9, 13). So, an increase in the 
size of a country’s banking sector relative to securities and stock market capitalization is associated with 
lower GDP growth in the subsequent five-year period, when conditioning on the variation of asset prices 
is taken into account. However, for the more developed group of economies non-significant estimates are 
found. The interaction term between bank-market ratio and growth periods of the stock market does not 
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present any statistical significance results, in line with Langfield and Pagano (2016), while the respective 
slump dummy exhibits a positive association with GDP in the subsequent 5 year period. Interestingly, 
when we include the standard control variables in our specification results differ substantially, as the 
statistically significant negative effect of the bank-market ratio is no longer present15 (see Table 9, columns 
5-12). The latter also holds for the interactions between growth and slump periods and the bank-market 
ratio, as no significant relations are found. On the other hand, it is of interest to note that the credit to 
deposit ratio (CRED_DEP), which has been introduced as a measure of systemic risk, consistently has a 
negative sign and often becomes significant. It should be also noted that for the last exercise we used the 
threshold of 2% which gave stable signs of variables of interest in different groups of countries and can 
be thought as representing if there is relative gain or loss in the considered markets in real terms.  
                                                           
15 It should be pointed out that insignificance of financial-market-structure-connected series remains also when 
credit to deposit ratio (CRED_DEP) is absent from specifications presented in Columns (9) –(12) of Table 11. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Threshold (annual): 10% 10% 10% 10% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
VARIABLES \ Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 
                                  
PC_MK -1.304*** -0.569 -0.136 -0.0291 -1.202*** -0.403 0.0127 -0.128 -1.150*** -0.392 -0.277 -0.554 -1.109*** -0.525 -0.335 -0.677 
 (0.399) (0.369) (0.424) (1.028) (0.408) (0.339) (0.452) (0.871) (0.399) (0.332) (0.532) (0.680) (0.396) (0.333) (0.570) (0.619) 
PC_MK (SM slump) 1.215*** 0.0863 0.0120 -55.45 1.163*** 0.126 0.0539 -0.408 1.059** 0.0725 0.309 -0.136 1.016** 0.263 0.459 0.0142 
 (0.397) (0.657) (0.707) (68.30) (0.391) (0.490) (0.382) (0.337) (0.393) (0.363) (0.281) (0.493) (0.385) (0.365) (0.360) (0.716) 
PC_MK (SM growth) 0.621 0.525 0.293 0.0945 0.219 0.0351 -0.115 -0.203 0.221 -0.0197 0.180 0.00314 0.0753 0.107 0.246 0.136 
 (0.409) (0.339) (0.355) (0.581) (0.374) (0.320) (0.327) (0.483) (0.377) (0.295) (0.413) (0.638) (0.366) (0.265) (0.411) (0.793) 
SM slump -0.765 0.321 0.446 58.52 -1.017** -0.212 0.156 1.010* -0.839** -0.0258 -0.112 0.761 -0.872** -0.223 -0.212 0.752 
 (0.537) (0.751) (0.956) (71.10) (0.467) (0.457) (0.632) (0.457) (0.384) (0.330) (0.469) (0.765) (0.352) (0.349) (0.571) (0.876) 
SM growth -0.534 -0.182 0.0860 0.268 -0.0868 0.113 0.292 0.491 -0.0151 0.164 -0.154 0.0759 0.0203 0.00473 -0.116 0.0328 
 (0.372) (0.328) (0.419) (0.588) (0.344) (0.297) (0.474) (0.733) (0.335) (0.287) (0.499) (0.900) (0.343) (0.225) (0.620) (1.033) 
Constant 2.399*** 0.498 -0.679 -0.614 2.211*** 0.340 -0.799 -0.460 2.016*** 0.323 -0.430 0.128 2.053*** 0.468 -0.494 0.0965 
 (0.633) (0.569) (0.716) (1.882) (0.644) (0.614) (0.906) (1.736) (0.582) (0.626) (0.940) (1.377) (0.588) (0.611) (1.023) (1.275) 
                 
Observations 450 320 195 122 450 320 195 122 450 320 195 122 450 320 195 122 
R-squared 0.321 0.611 0.672 0.722 0.313 0.596 0.662 0.727 0.306 0.594 0.663 0.731 0.307 0.594 0.665 0.737 
Number of cntr_id 40 27 19 10 40 27 19 10 40 27 19 10 40 27 19 10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table 8: Impact of ratio of private credit to outstanding debt securities and stock market capitalization on economic growth (and its 
interaction with growth and slump indicators of stock market), various thresholds. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average 
growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Fixed Effects. Unbalanced panel with sample 
initiating mainly from 1989.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES \ Countr. All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 
                          
CRED_DEP     -2.327** -0.989 -0.700 -3.880** -1.494** -0.701* -0.217 -0.509 
     (1.009) (0.833) (1.048) (1.609) (0.583) (0.378) (0.230) (0.738) 
PC_MK -1.109*** -0.525 -0.335 -0.677 -0.528 -0.327 -0.469 -0.134 -0.115 0.185 -0.182 -0.213 
 (0.396) (0.333) (0.570) (0.619) (0.404) (0.435) (0.694) (0.668) (0.313) (0.290) (0.201) (0.280) 
PC_MK (SM slump) 1.016** 0.263 0.459 0.0142 0.643* 0.283 0.665 0.125 0.196 0.200 0.222 0.115 
 (0.385) (0.365) (0.360) (0.716) (0.347) (0.405) (0.489) (0.672) (0.247) (0.281) (0.298) (0.355) 
PC_MK (SM growth) 0.0753 0.107 0.246 0.136 -0.0271 0.0939 0.460 -0.0793 -0.275 -0.0226 0.0509 -0.209 
 (0.366) (0.265) (0.411) (0.793) (0.363) (0.283) (0.457) (0.502) (0.300) (0.185) (0.191) (0.287) 
SM slump -0.872** -0.223 -0.212 0.752 -0.437 -0.134 -0.329 0.636 -0.212 -0.0540 -0.00668 0.196 
 (0.352) (0.349) (0.571) (0.876) (0.371) (0.392) (0.711) (0.819) (0.311) (0.301) (0.386) (0.501) 
SM growth 0.0203 0.00473 -0.116 0.0328 0.259 0.121 -0.250 0.408 0.540* 0.326 0.206 0.425 
 (0.343) (0.225) (0.620) (1.033) (0.344) (0.254) (0.776) (0.767) (0.314) (0.198) (0.332) (0.511) 
LGDP         -8.496*** -7.436*** -14.24*** -14.21*** 
         (2.711) (2.303) (3.195) (2.123) 
LEDU         5.720*** -1.511 -1.169 -0.100 
         (1.588) (1.462) (1.769) (1.178) 
LGC         0.118 -0.405 -6.253 -2.314 
         (2.185) (2.394) (4.735) (3.340) 
LOPEN         1.413 3.199** 4.011** 4.417** 
         (1.582) (1.195) (1.780) (1.576) 
LINF         -5.209 -10.08* -11.61 6.591 
         (4.454) (5.551) (6.966) (5.606) 
             
Observations 450 320 195 122 426 296 171 122 386 282 168 121 
R-squared 0.307 0.594 0.665 0.737 0.396 0.596 0.661 0.825 0.588 0.742 0.855 0.941 
Number of cntr_id 40 27 19 10 39 26 18 10 37 26 18 10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
Table 9: Impact of ratio of private credit to outstanding debt securities and stock market capitalization on economic growth (and its 
interaction with growth and slump indicators of stock market), 2% annual threshold. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita 
average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Fixed Effects. Unbalanced panel with 
sample initiating mainly from 1989 
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In the next two groups of estimations we re-estimate the specification taking into account housing 
prices instead of stock market ones (see Tables 10 & 11 below). We can once more infer that negative 
effect of the bank-market ratio vanishes when the standard set of control variables is included in our 
estimations. This also holds for the interaction referring to the slump period of the housing market and 
the bank-market ratio.  The interesting insight is that relative increase of credit financing during periods 
of high growth in the housing market reduces economic growth rates: it has consistently negative sign of 
impact and also significant for the cases of all countries and EU member states (columns (9) and (11)). This 
is again fully consistent with the previously results established in Tables 5 and 7.  
We next summarize the empirical findings about the bank-to-market based financing impact on 
economic growth under different conditions in stock and housing markets as represented by their asset 
prices. For larger sample of countries there is evidence that, evaluating unconditionally, expansion of 
relative bank-based financing hurts economic growth, whereas the negative effect disappears during the 
slumps of stock market (the positive coefficient of interaction term PC_MK (SM slump) is insignificantly 
different in absolute terms from the negative coefficient of unconditional credit-to-market impact 
revealed by PC_MK indicator). For the EU and EMU both the unconditional impact and the cushion effect 
does not seem to be significant and all the effects become insignificant after including the ‘standard 
controls’.  
For larger sample of countries, the boom in housing prices coupled with relative expansion of 
credit reduces the growth rates and survives the conditioning on the control variables. It also remains 
significant in the EU case when the controls are included. In fact, the credit-to-market interaction with 
housing booms (PC_MK (HS growth)) term is among the two variables that consistently retain the (negative) 
sign across various groups of countries and specifications. The other one being the credit-to-deposit 
variable.  It seems therefore that there is a general tendency for future growth rates to decrease when 
the credit is not financed out of savings and when there are booms of housing prices coupled with 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Threshold (annual): 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
VARIABLES \ Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 
                                  
PC_MK -0.335*** -0.970*** 0.312 -0.300 -0.328*** -0.837** 0.439 0.436 -0.161 -0.668* 0.476 0.777 -0.100 -0.850** 0.194 1.060 
 (0.111) (0.310) (0.493) (0.693) (0.0759) (0.364) (0.520) (1.101) (0.128) (0.371) (0.539) (1.142) (0.148) (0.382) (0.387) (1.135) 
PC_MK (HS slump) -0.742 2.044*** 0.629 0.456 -0.638 0.923 0.404 -0.435 -0.295 -0.204 0.241 -0.998 -0.216 0.0680 0.504 -0.450 
 (0.866) (0.692) (0.774) (0.414) (0.668) (0.561) (0.857) (0.968) (0.444) (0.506) (0.330) (0.962) (0.484) (0.490) (0.328) (0.831) 
PC_MK (HS growth) -0.344 -0.0630 -0.524 -0.175 -0.530* -0.109 -0.568 -1.095 -0.317*** -0.419 -0.654 -1.468 -0.336*** -0.239 -0.353 -1.577 
 (0.338) (0.389) (0.394) (0.442) (0.271) (0.404) (0.494) (0.924) (0.109) (0.415) (0.535) (0.999) (0.0744) (0.371) (0.506) (1.008) 
HS slump 1.371 -1.135 0.223 0.587 1.131 -0.0758 0.202 1.595 0.601 0.488 0.368 2.020 0.588 0.145 0.655 2.136 
 (0.980) (0.780) (0.892) (0.469) (0.756) (0.760) (0.925) (1.217) (0.517) (0.662) (0.272) (1.158) (0.550) (0.594) (0.433) (1.238) 
HS growth -0.342 -0.183 0.255 0.174 -0.461 -0.160 -0.0632 1.049 -0.576** 0.0946 -0.00175 1.215 -0.314 -0.0185 0.322 2.141 
 (0.430) (0.281) (0.373) (0.404) (0.291) (0.285) (0.534) (1.124) (0.267) (0.306) (0.533) (1.199) (0.208) (0.316) (0.688) (1.463) 
Constant 1.106*** 1.239** -1.122 -0.192 1.598*** 1.166** -0.836 -0.975 1.455*** 1.161** -0.727 -1.070 1.226*** 1.325** -0.899 -2.117 
 (0.262) (0.461) (0.972) (1.379) (0.337) (0.510) (0.863) (1.778) (0.322) (0.497) (0.811) (1.744) (0.297) (0.544) (0.783) (1.998) 
                 
Observations 408 302 181 120 408 302 181 120 408 302 181 120 408 302 181 120 
R-squared 0.458 0.650 0.723 0.708 0.510 0.655 0.734 0.715 0.483 0.642 0.743 0.720 0.456 0.638 0.743 0.722 
Number of cntr_id 33 20 15 9 33 20 15 9 33 20 15 9 33 20 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
Table 10: Impact of ratio of private credit to outstanding debt securities and stock market capitalization (PC_MK) on economic growth 
(and its interaction with growth and slump indicators of housing market), various thresholds. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per 
capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Fixed Effects. Unbalanced panel 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES \ Countr.: All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EU1999 
                          
CRED_DEP     -1.513* -0.709 -0.796 -4.089*** -1.180** -0.685* -0.399 -1.272 
     (0.836) (0.782) (0.912) (1.203) (0.522) (0.342) (0.247) (0.967) 
PC_MK -0.161 -0.668* 0.476 0.777 0.0118 -0.565 0.581 0.613 0.127 -0.0139 0.0753 -0.0692 
 (0.128) (0.371) (0.539) (1.142) (0.102) (0.420) (0.638) (0.643) (0.114) (0.312) (0.242) (0.335) 
PC_MK (HS slump) -0.295 -0.204 0.241 -0.998 -0.168 -0.0801 0.0230 1.106* 0.485 0.821* 0.159 -0.0121 
 (0.444) (0.506) (0.330) (0.962) (0.448) (0.563) (0.380) (0.538) (0.295) (0.410) (0.324) (0.554) 
PC_MK (HS growth) -0.317*** -0.419 -0.654 -1.468 -0.312*** -0.537 -0.715 -0.679 -0.322*** -0.263 -0.359* -0.247 
 (0.109) (0.415) (0.535) (0.999) (0.107) (0.402) (0.536) (0.426) (0.0887) (0.337) (0.189) (0.377) 
HS slump 0.601 0.488 0.368 2.020 0.338 0.254 0.753 -0.245 -0.643 -0.999* -0.466 -0.522 
 (0.517) (0.662) (0.272) (1.158) (0.587) (0.790) (0.463) (0.500) (0.384) (0.512) (0.580) (0.621) 
HS growth -0.576** 0.0946 -0.00175 1.215 -0.431 0.215 0.112 0.619 0.175 0.435 0.0868 0.205 
 (0.267) (0.306) (0.533) (1.199) (0.266) (0.304) (0.724) (0.672) (0.241) (0.277) (0.271) (0.471) 
LGDP         -7.174*** -7.414*** -14.13*** -12.60** 
         (1.543) (2.193) (2.973) (3.815) 
LEDU         2.902* -0.569 -0.427 -0.735 
         (1.501) (1.053) (0.718) (1.018) 
LGC         -0.121 0.568 -0.625 -0.265 
         (1.986) (2.113) (3.812) (4.111) 
LOPEN         2.719* 3.786*** 4.967*** 4.146** 
         (1.341) (1.303) (1.487) (1.604) 
LINF         -18.32*** -7.995 10.03 10.37 
         (5.225) (6.681) (11.76) (11.86) 
             
Observations 408 302 181 120 379 273 152 120 339 260 149 119 
R-squared 0.483 0.642 0.743 0.720 0.519 0.647 0.751 0.845 0.726 0.792 0.918 0.919 
Number of cntr_id 33 20 15 9 32 19 14 9 30 19 14 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
Table 11: Impact of ratio of private credit to outstanding debt securities and stock market capitalization (PC_MK) on economic growth 
(and its interaction with growth and slump indicators of housing market), 2% annual threshold. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per 
capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Fixed Effects. Unbalanced panel 
with sample initiating mainly from 1990. 
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 4.3. Shifts of financial structure and growth empirics  
To illustrate economic significance of the established results, we provide in the final part of this report 
some estimates on the possible impact of a change of financial composition in terms of the amount of 
credit provided in the economy among different sources (i.e. bank credit, debt securities or the stock 
market). In order to avoid too many assumptions we restrict ourselves to a very simple scenario of an 
increase of stock market capitalization in the EU MS by 10 percentage points, with the respective 
reduction of private credit originating from banks deriving the impact for various countries depending on 
their actual structure of financing (see Figure D1 in Appendix D). Note that the solid horizontal line signifies 
the overall median of impact (derived from all years), whereas the thinner one represents that of the 
particular year, and the relative coefficients are derived from Table 2, column 3 (see above).  
Looking at the median impact of the described shift by 10 percentage points, we can infer that in 
1995 it would have led to a median raise in 5-year GDP growth rates by more than 0.11 percentage point 
thereafter (see top-left chart). If the same shift of financial structure would have been implemented later 
on, the median impact becomes smaller. For instance, its implementation in 2013 would yield already 
only about 0.06 percentage point faster median 5-year growth rates (see bottom-right chart). Overall 
there is a path dependency of economic significance of structural policy on growth, implied by that the 
higher is the financial penetration, the lower will be a particular effect of this policy.  
The above conclusions are based on the log-linear model estimated using credit series from the 
WB GFDD database. It should be pointed out that these data series on credit seem to have structural 
breaks for e.g. France, Denmark, Sweden. Hence, in Figure D2 of Appendix D we also present the 
calculated impact using the BIS credit data and the respective estimated model with log-linear financial 
series (see column 3 of Table 7). The ranking of the impact in the countries remains similar as well as the 
fading out impact for the later years of intervention, but the median impact on economic growth rates is 
higher and now reaches 0.21 percentage points (from 0.27 in 1995, to 0.14 in 2013).  
The fading out effect of the impact established previously using the log-linear specification is 
connected with higher penetration of financing; to achieve the same impact on growth with higher levels 
of financial penetration requires larger adjustments in terms of structure. It is not the case anymore with 
the non-linear model. We therefore repeat the exercise using non-linear estimated model (see columns 7 
and 11 of Table 7) and present the results in Figures D3 and D4 (see Appendix D), respectively. Since the 
later specification with the ratio of households to firm credit is available only for the data from BIS and 
the specifications in Table 7 for the EU and EMU are more significant than that with the WB presented in 
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Table 3, we rely in these simulations on the BIS data-linked estimates. Results connected with both 
specifications produce similar qualitative pattern with slightly higher median impact (ranging from 0.21 in 
1995 to 0.32 in 2008) when derived using column 7 of Table 7 and somewhat smaller (ranging from 0.14 
in 1995 to 0.29 in 2008) when derived using column 11 of Table 7.   
As it is revealed by Figures 8 and 9, a simple and uniform reduction of the share of credit is no 
more beneficial for certain countries, because it could even worsen economic growth situation in some 
of them, provided that credit would have deviated even further from the peak of impact (turning point) 
due to this implemented policy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This report offers insights on the financial development and economic growth debate, while emphasizing 
on relevant empirics for the European Union and the Euro area. The empirical findings can be grouped in 
several categories. First, results highlight that financial structure and growth are inextricably linked. 
Specifically, credit provided by banks presents an inverted U-like effect on growth (although having more 
general non-linearity than a simple inverted U-shape). For the EMU MS the threshold (peak of positive 
impact) is found to be close to 50%. This is conditional on the actual financing structure with substantial 
share of bank credit going to households. If all credit were directed towards financing of non-financial 
corporations, the estimated turning point would shift to around 65%. Estimates using the whole EU 
sample give similar but somewhat smaller thresholds. Consequently, large bank credit penetration 
relative to GDP, especially with heavy financing of households, can be more harmful to economic growth 
than estimated/thought previously. 
Second, the structure of financing matters for economic growth: both the type of instrument of 
financing (bank loans, debt securities, and stock market) and the type of fund receivers (households, firms 
or financial corporations). Starting from the type of financing, bank credit appears to have the most 
negative impact and stock market a more positive one on economic growth during the analyzed period. 
Interestingly, the unconditional impact of outstanding debt securities tends to be negative, but when GDP 
growth rates are low relative to lending interest rates and/or stock market volatility is high, larger share 
of debt securities can facilitate economic growth. 
Third, further disaggregation by beneficiaries of financial means reveals that the established 
negative impact of bank credit is connected with substantial financing of households. On the contrary, 
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bank credit to non-financial corporations tends to contribute to economic growth instead of hindering it. 
Furthermore, it seems to be more effective in terms of promoting economic growth relative to the 
financing using debt securities of non-financial corporations on average. In a similar manner, debt 
securities issued by the financial corporations seem to induce negative influence on future economic 
growth rates. Partially, this can be connected with that the domestic savings are outsourced to other 
markets thus reducing local funding of investments rather than due to poor performance of the financial 
institutions per se.   
Fourth, and consistent with the third, expansion of bank credit relative to market-based financing 
during housing market booms affects economic growth negatively. Housing market booms facilitate 
expansion of credit to households both due to the increased needs for those acquiring housing and 
because of larger value of collateral acceptable to banks. This, together with larger return rates in this 
market, can divert and even reduce the means devoted to financing of productive firm investments. There 
also seem to be a general tendency for future growth rates to decrease whenever credit amounts are 
larger relative to (financed not out of) savings. 
 Finally, from the policy perspective, several alternatives connected with the financial deepness 
and its structure would seem to promote economic growth. Regarding the banking sector, it can be 
achieved both by reducing the bank credit to GDP levels in a number of European countries (as Europe’s 
financial structure has become strongly bank-based with substantial bank credit penetration), and also by 
directing more credit towards non-financial corporations. The later has smaller economic impact on 
average, but the former depends nontrivially on the initial conditions of a particular economy (namely, 
the actual distance from the peak of credit impact, level of financial penetration of all modes of finance, 
etc.). Further development of debt securities market seem to be beneficial mostly with facilitation of 
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Appendix A: Definitions and County Groups  
 
Table 1A: Definitions and Sources of Original Data 
Variable Definition Source 
GDP GDP per capita (constant LCU). 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
PC  
The financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP. Domestic money banks comprise 
commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, 
such as demand deposits. 
Global Financial Development 
Database (WB); 2015 
PC (BIS) 
Total credit received by non-financial sector 
(adjusted for breaks). 
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), Credit to the Non-financial 
Sector; 2016 
PDS 
Total amount of domestic private debt securities 
(amount outstanding) issued in domestic 
markets as a share of GDP. It covers long-term 
bonds and notes, treasury bills, commercial 
paper and other short-term notes. 
Global Financial development 
Database (WB); Original source: Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS); 
2016 
SMC 
Market capitalization of listed domestic 
companies as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
PCHSH Private credit received by households. 
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), Credit to the Non-financial 
Sector; 2016.  
PCNFC 
Private credit received by non-financial 
corporations. 
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), Credit to the Non-financial 
Sector; 2016 
DSFCO Debt securities issued by financial corporations. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Debt Securities Statistics; 2016.  
DSNFC 
Debt securities issued by non-financial 
corporations. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Debt Securities Statistics; 2016. 
SM_VOL 
Stock price volatility which is the average of the 
360-day volatility of the national stock market 
index. 
Global Financial Development 
Database (WB); 2015 
RGDPGR 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
RIR 
Real interest rate: the lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
CRED_DEPOS Bank credit to bank deposits (%).  
Global Financial Development 
Database (WB); 2015. Original source: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
EDU 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes 
(%). 




General government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
OPEN 
Trade openness (calculated as exports plus 
imports divided by GDP). 
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
INF 
Inflation, measured by the consumer price index 
(annual %).  
World Bank; World Development 
Indicators (WDI); 2015 
Table 2A: Groups of Countries 














EMU1999 AUT,BEL,FIN,FRA,DEU,IRL,ITA,LUX,NLD,PRT,ESP. 11 
* These countries constitute the corresponding groups of countries starting from Table 2. The
number of observations available in the specific estimations can be smaller due to data limitation. 
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Appendix B: Economic variables and specifications 
 
From the economic perspective, the vector of explanatory variables , in eq. (1) covers a couple 
of different types of variables. First, some standard control variables are included almost in all cases 
covering: 
LGDP – logarithm of income per capita,  
LEDU – logarithm of gross enrolment ratio16, secondary, both sexes (%),  
LGC – logarithm of general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP), 
LOPEN – logarithm of trade (% of GDP), 
LINF – the inverse hyperbolic sigh transform (IHST) of consumer price inflation rate in % (CPI), i.e.   
log(CPI/100+sqrt(1+(CPI/100)^2)), where the IHST allows avoiding problems related to zero and 
negative values appearing when the usual log transformation is applied. 
Second, , also covers several financial series under consideration used in different specifications: 
a) in Table 1, following Arcand et al. (2015), we include: 
i. PC - private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%), 
ii. PC2 – square of PC; 
b) in Tables 2–4, in order to account for different financial structure we include: 
i. LPC – logarithm of PC, 
ii. LPDS – logarithm of outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (%), 
iii. LSMC – logarithm of market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP); 
c) in Tables 5–6, we look at nonlinear impact by augmenting the specification indicated in b) with 
LPC2 (square of LPC) and additional interaction terms of LPDS with 
i. SM_VOL80 – an indicator if stock market volatility is higher than the 8th decile,  
ii. exp(RIR-RGDPGR) – exponent of the difference between real interest rates (RIR) and the 
growth rate of real GDP (RGDPGR); 
                                                           
16 In this we follow Gambacorta et al. (2014), however main results remain unchanged if e.g. Barro and Lee logarithm 
of total average years of total schooling, age 25+ were used. We prefer the former one, because it has positive 
impact in most of considered equations, whereas the latter one becomes negative more often. 
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d) in Table 7, we look at the impact of structural composition of credit and outstanding private debt 
securities by including (in addition to LSMC): 
i. LPCHSH – logarithm of market value of credit to households & NPISHs (% to GDP), 
ii. LPCNFC – logarithm of market value of credit to Non-financial corporation (% to GDP), 
iii. LPDSFCO – IHST of outstanding debt securities by financial corporations (% to GDP) 
iv. LPDSNFC – IHST of outstanding debt securities by non-financial corporations (% to GDP). 
e) in Tables 8–9, we augment the Table 5 specification with interaction terms of LPC with ratio of  
private credit to households (PCHSH) to credit to non-financial corporations (PCNFC) and LPDS 
with ratio of outstanding private debt securities by financial corporations (PDSFCO) to that of non-
financial corporations (PDSNFC), i.e.: 
i. LPC*PCRAT = LPC*(PCHSH/ PCNFC), 
ii. LPDS*DSRAT = LPDS*(PDSFCO / PDSNFC), 
f) in Tables 10–12, similar to Langfield and Pagano (2016) the impact of financial structure is 
investigated by including: 
i. PC_MK – ratio of PC to sum of outstanding private debt securities and stock market 
capitalization, 
ii. PC_MK (SM slump) – PC_MK interaction with stock market slump intensity indicator, 
iii. PC_MK (SM growth) – PC_MK interaction with stock market growth intensity indicator, 
iv. SM slump – stock market slump intensity indicator, 
v. SM growth – stock market growth intensity indicator, 




Appendix C: Sensitivity analysis of type of financing 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Interaction term: LPC LPC LPC LPC LPDS LPDS LPDS LPDS LSMC LSMC LSMC LSMC 
VARIABLES \ Countries: All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
LGDP -17.25*** -13.78*** -20.82*** -11.30*** -15.45*** -12.86*** -16.76*** -11.21*** -14.39*** -12.84*** -16.96*** -11.75*** 
 (3.330) (2.877) (4.357) (1.450) (3.170) (2.700) (3.156) (1.875) (3.190) (2.843) (3.640) (2.193) 
LEDU 1.213** 0.526 0.379 -0.490 1.447** 0.684 0.470 -0.100 1.559** 0.580 0.336 -0.0478 
 (0.558) (0.402) (0.507) (0.499) (0.633) (0.423) (0.573) (0.582) (0.675) (0.395) (0.484) (0.622) 
LGC 0.743 2.458* -0.846 4.795*** 1.258 2.756** -0.398 3.611** 1.106 2.530* -0.364 3.716*** 
 (1.141) (1.371) (2.078) (1.210) (1.066) (1.292) (1.600) (1.631) (1.107) (1.343) (1.918) (1.232) 
LOPEN 0.485 0.978* 0.677 2.818*** 0.549 1.132* 0.883 2.855*** 0.608 1.137* 1.125 2.695*** 
 (0.552) (0.588) (0.741) (0.340) (0.615) (0.588) (0.803) (0.286) (0.680) (0.589) (0.732) (0.361) 
LINF 0.533 0.178 -2.532 0.216 0.994 0.129 -3.477* -1.558 1.125 0.331 -2.468 -1.995 
 (0.980) (0.921) (1.922) (3.776) (0.974) (0.992) (1.852) (3.855) (1.002) (0.924) (1.793) (3.890) 
LPC -0.536** -0.310 -0.527** -0.374 -0.842*** -0.418* -0.611** -0.430 -0.851*** -0.387* -0.623** -0.410 
 (0.231) (0.209) (0.263) (0.473) (0.309) (0.236) (0.290) (0.489) (0.305) (0.219) (0.299) (0.471) 
LPDS -0.176*** -0.247* -0.205 -0.591*** -0.159** -0.251* -0.238 -0.568*** -0.175*** -0.228 -0.212* -0.531*** 
 (0.0537) (0.138) (0.132) (0.133) (0.0650) (0.151) (0.154) (0.129) (0.0616) (0.143) (0.125) (0.128) 
LSMC -0.0193 0.0725 0.0414 0.267*** 0.0106 0.0887 0.0294 0.219*** 0.0345 0.101 0.0896 0.265*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0698) (0.0638) (0.0702) (0.0727) (0.0698) (0.0647) (0.0814) (0.0947) (0.0860) (0.0859) (0.0875) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2003) -0.322** -0.166 -0.462*** 0.0729 -0.0673* -0.0878*** -0.111** 0.0485 -0.0543 -0.0685 -0.103 0.00887 
 (0.137) (0.114) (0.149) (0.137) (0.0375) (0.0277) (0.0476) (0.124) (0.0581) (0.0798) (0.0953) (0.116) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2004) -0.335* -0.00622 -0.241 0.840* -0.171*** -0.0677 -0.165 0.217 -0.000170 0.0994 -0.0385 -0.167 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.327) (0.468) (0.0618) (0.105) (0.115) (0.503) (0.109) (0.142) (0.246) (0.305) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2005) -0.286*** -0.242*** -0.160 -0.223 -0.0755 0.0127 -0.00693 -0.384*** -0.0193 -0.174* -0.0843 -0.240* 
 (0.0707) (0.0866) (0.100) (0.160) (0.0565) (0.0799) (0.0652) (0.0895) (0.0966) (0.104) (0.0696) (0.125) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2006) -0.231** -0.0585 -0.378* -0.389 -0.0379 0.0884 -0.0294 0.255 0.0393 0.00753 -0.139 -0.0383 
 (0.0956) (0.0817) (0.208) (0.294) (0.0529) (0.107) (0.0983) (0.193) (0.0487) (0.0606) (0.109) (0.214) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2007) -0.361*** -0.220** -0.201 -0.574*** -0.0791 -0.0349 0.0220 -0.0185 0.000738 0.00526 -0.0229 -0.00393 
 (0.0742) (0.0896) (0.169) (0.213) (0.0566) (0.0728) (0.0914) (0.172) (0.0613) (0.0745) (0.0933) (0.215) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2008) -0.343** -0.0741 -0.313 0.0834 -0.0704** -0.0358 0.00799 0.296 0.0340 0.0350 -0.0857 0.0190 
 (0.134) (0.109) (0.223) (0.247) (0.0346) (0.0472) (0.0659) (0.223) (0.0520) (0.0692) (0.138) (0.177) 
Observations 468 360 232 135 468 360 232 135 468 360 232 135 
R-squared 0.718 0.748 0.801 0.908 0.693 0.743 0.799 0.901 0.676 0.740 0.791 0.900 
Number of cntr_id 43 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 
Table C1: Sensitivity: crisis period dummy interaction terms (an interaction term used in each case is specified in the second line, which is bolded). 
Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates over 5 year periods ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Anderson-
Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample initiating mainly from 1990 (LGDP instrumented also with previous data).  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Future 
periods: h=3 h=3 h=3 h=3 h=4 h=4 h=4 h=4 h=6 h=6 h=6 h=6 h=7 h=7 h=7 h=7 
VARIABLES All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 All avlb. OECD EU EMU1999 
                                  
LGDP -16.68*** -15.36*** -17.62*** -17.91*** -11.69*** -9.293** -12.52*** -9.661** -12.67*** -11.41*** -15.58*** -13.59*** -12.37*** -9.203** -13.40*** -14.66*** 
 (4.326) (4.246) (4.778) (5.426) (3.887) (3.712) (4.202) (4.308) (2.889) (3.224) (3.586) (2.306) (2.897) (4.137) (3.668) (2.518) 
LEDU -0.332 -0.908 -0.552 0.667 1.069 0.418 0.468 0.886** 0.519 -0.214 -0.488 0.241 0.585* -0.0157 -0.0839 0.390** 
 (0.859) (0.856) (0.761) (0.542) (0.832) (0.478) (0.473) (0.433) (0.506) (0.421) (0.487) (0.289) (0.322) (0.322) (0.360) (0.186) 
LGC 2.733** 4.623** 0.780 1.357 2.160 4.797*** 3.098** 4.399** 0.756 1.077 -1.105 1.259 0.434 0.978 -1.014 -1.004 
 (1.342) (1.895) (1.932) (2.318) (1.369) (1.601) (1.515) (1.919) (0.792) (1.264) (2.031) (0.952) (0.769) (1.482) (1.537) (1.263) 
LOPEN 0.428 0.938 1.676** 3.165*** 0.712 1.479* 1.860** 4.050*** 0.666 1.426*** 1.307** 1.421** 0.320 0.944 0.974*** 0.717 
 (0.674) (0.682) (0.750) (1.070) (0.664) (0.791) (0.918) (0.421) (0.510) (0.537) (0.646) (0.629) (0.481) (0.594) (0.361) (0.479) 
LINF 3.326** 3.178 -6.262*** -3.770 2.554** 1.416 -1.463 -2.648 -0.0485 -1.607* -3.812** -0.121 0.265 -0.542 -2.203 3.342 
 (1.644) (2.677) (1.893) (3.820) (1.172) (1.757) (2.010) (1.886) (1.048) (0.899) (1.819) (3.190) (0.772) (0.721) (1.829) (2.994) 
LPC -1.563*** -0.774** -0.943** -1.261* -1.174*** -0.690** -0.705* -0.871 -0.758*** -0.306* -0.628*** -0.835** -0.484*** -0.377*** -0.561*** -0.238 
 (0.446) (0.304) (0.422) (0.749) (0.335) (0.283) (0.389) (0.568) (0.293) (0.167) (0.208) (0.372) (0.188) (0.144) (0.138) (0.194) 
LPDS -0.0343 -0.106 -0.311** -0.474* -0.0922 -0.184 -0.307** -0.488*** -0.0934* -0.105 -0.0916 -0.241*** 0.0225 -0.166 -0.154 -0.151 
 (0.0863) (0.203) (0.157) (0.255) (0.0863) (0.190) (0.126) (0.142) (0.0498) (0.129) (0.114) (0.0780) (0.0850) (0.208) (0.180) (0.142) 
LSMC 0.255** 0.186* -0.164 -0.296** 0.121 0.0356 0.00288 -0.0954 -0.0122 0.0242 -0.0363 -0.0445 0.0198 0.101 -0.0219 0.106 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.168) (0.149) (0.0887) (0.0645) (0.0567) (0.124) (0.0943) (0.0494) (0.0608) (0.139) (0.0700) (0.0659) (0.0590) (0.0856) 
                 
Observations 528 397 256 151 499 379 245 143 432 337 215 126 394 312 196 117 
R-squared 0.673 0.717 0.820 0.863 0.639 0.690 0.772 0.882 0.662 0.693 0.785 0.867 0.656 0.677 0.771 0.874 
Number of 
cntr_id 44 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 43 30 23 11 42 29 23 11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
 
Table C2: Sensitivity: different future periods. Dependent variable: yearly GDP per capita average growth rates over 5 year periods 
ahead. Credit data source: World Bank. Estimator: Anderson-Hsiao. Unbalanced panel with sample initiating mainly from 1990 (LGDP 




Figure C1: Coefficients of financing components in a log-linear model of economic growth as in eq. (1) for different 
future growth periods h∈{3,4,6,7} and groups of countries (AH estimator). 
Note: LPC - private credit by banks to GDP; LDC - outstanding private debt securities to GDP; LSMC - stock market 















Appendix D: Simulated impact of changing financials 
composition  
 
Figure D1: Impact with 95% confidence bounds on growth (in p.p.) from reducing private credit 
while increasing stock market capitalization to GDP by 10 p.p. (EU AH estimation), WB data, log-
linear model (column 3 of Table 2). 
 
 
Note: solid horizontal line signifies the overall median of impact (derived from all years), 
whereas the thinner one represents that of the particular year.  
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Figure D2: Impact with 95% confidence bounds on growth (in p.p.) from reducing private credit 
while increasing stock market capitalization to GDP by 10 p.p. (EU AH estimation), BIS data, log-
linear model (column 3 of Table 9). 
 
 
Note: solid horizontal line signifies the overall median of impact (derived from all years), 





Figure D3: Impact with 95% confidence bounds on growth (in p.p.) from reducing private credit 
while increasing stock market capitalization to GDP by 10 p.p. (EU AH estimation) BIS data, non-
linear model (column 7 of Table 9). 
 
Note: solid horizontal line signifies the overall median of impact (derived from all years), 





Figure D4: Impact with 95% confidence bounds on growth (in p.p.) from reducing private credit 
while increasing stock market capitalization to GDP by 10 p.p. (EU AH estimation) BIS data, non-
linear model (column 11 of Table 9). 
 
Note: solid horizontal line signifies the overall median of impact (derived from all years), 





Appendix E: Calculation of marginal impact and turning 
point 
Denote by x the argument of interest (some financial series in our case) and let z be the part explaining 
the dependent variable which does not depend on x. Then y = f(x,z) + z defines the value of the dependent 
variable y (growth rate in our case) at given values of x and z, where f: A×B → ℜ, A,B ⊂ ℜ. Namely, we 
consider the parameterization of (financial) impact of x by 
f(x,z)  =  α x + β ln(x) + δ ln(x)^2+ φ z⋅ln(x) 
with the marginal impact 
∂y/∂x  =  ∂f(x,z)/∂x  =  α + (β + φ z)/x + 2δ ln(x)/x. 
In simpler specifications α = 0 and/or φ = 0 are pre-imposed. Under proper values of parameters 
that ensure the negative second order derivative at the extreme, the peak of impact x*(z) satisfies  
α x*(z) + 2δ ln(x*(z)) = - (β + φ z), 
which, forα = 0, simply yields 
x*(z) =  exp{ - (β +φ z)/2δ }. 
For instance, when z stands for the ratio of bank credit to households and non-financial corporations 
(correspondingly, with parameters satisfying β > 0, φ < 0, δ < 0), the turning point of f (in terms of x) 
corresponding to total amount of credit going only to firms is given by x*:= x*(0). 
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